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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 2016, the Dallas Police Department affixed a pound
of C4 plastic explosive to a remotely-controlled bomb disposal robot
and rolled it into a parking garage that held a barricaded gunman,
Micah X. Johnson.2 A little over two hours earlier, Johnson engaged
the Dallas police in a 45-minute gun battle in which he killed five
2

See Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five
Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html
(describing the events of the shootings).
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officers and wounded nine others, including two civilians.3 Shortly
after the robot entered the garage, the Dallas Police detonated the
C4, killing Johnson. In doing so, the Dallas police ushered in a new
age in police use of lethal force in American law enforcement.4
Over the last decade, the United States has increasingly used
drones in its “war on terror.”5 Media, legal and academic scholars,
and novelists have extensively analyzed the use of these devices in
this context, which has made the drone the quintessential symbol of
21st century warfare.6
However, less has been written about American domestic law
enforcement’s use of similar technology.7 Yet a brief survey of
3

Id.
See generally Melissa Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
155 (2017) [hereinafter Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force] (providing legal
analysis on the use of police force in the Dallas shooting).
5
See generally WILLIAM M. ARKIN, UNMANNED: DRONES, DATA, AND THE
ILLUSION OF PERFECT WARFARE 147–75 (Little, Brown and Co., 1st ed. 2015)
(providing an overview of U.S. drone use in the “war” against terror); AVERY
PLAW, MATTHEW S. FRICKER & CARLOS R. COLON, THE DRONE DEBATE: A
PRIMER ON THE U.S. USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OUTSIDE CONVENTIONAL
BATTLEFIELDS 13-63 (2016); P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS
REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 19–41 (1st ed. 2009); Laurie
R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 675 (2012); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015).
6
See supra note 5.
7
That is not to say that it has not been written about. See generally Alexandra
A. Breshears, Use of Armed Drones by Domestic Law Enforcement: Presence and
the Fourth Reasonableness Factor, 33 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 183 (2016); Eric
Brumfield, Armed Drones for Law Enforcement: Why It Might Be Time to ReExamine the Current Use of Force Standard, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543 (2014);
Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force, supra note 4; Melissa Hamilton, Police Robots
and the Law, 31 NO. 1 WESTLAW JOURNAL WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 1, 4 (2016)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Police Robots and the Law]; Chris Jenks, State Labs of
Federalism and Law Enforcement “Drone” Use, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389
(2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
516 (2016); Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2016) [hereinafter McNeal, Drones and the Future
of Aerial Surveillance]; Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W. VA. L. REV.
863 (2017).
4
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media reports and internet searches using the term “[insert
municipality police department] drone use” reveals that many U.S.
law enforcement agencies incorporate or are considering
incorporating semi-autonomous “drones” or “robots” into their daily
operations.8 As of April 2017, the Center for the Study of the Drone
at Bard College in New York noted that “at least 347 state and local
8

See Jonathan Bullington, New Orleans Police Considering Drones, Transit
Hub Changes, in Wake of Weekend Violence, NOLA.COM (Dec. 1, 2015, 6:34 PM),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/12/new_orleans_police_drones_buse
.html (describing that the New Orleans Police Department is “testing the use of
drones to aid in crime-scene investigations”); Benny Evangelista, Fire, Police
Drones Caught Between Saving Lives, Guarding Rights, S.F. CHRON. (May 11,
2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Fire-policedrones-caught-between-saving-lives-11137289.php (reporting on public safety
including police use of drones in the San Francisco Bay area); Jerry Iannelli,
Miami Beach Police Department Buys Two Drones for $17,000, MIAMI NEW
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miamibeach-police-department-buys-two-drones-for-17000-9228675 (reporting on the
Miami Beach Police Department’s recent purchase of two drones, in addition to
the “military-grade” one it already had purchased in 2010); Kate Mather, LAPD
Becomes Nation’s Largest Police Department to Test Drones after Oversight
Panel Signs off on Controversial Program, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017, 9:05 PM),
http://beta.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-drones-20171017-story.html
(reporting on the LAPD’s decision to field a police drone no later than December
2017); Tina Moore, NYPD Considering Using Drones and Gunshot Detectors to
Fight Crime, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 20, 2014, 11:54 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-drones-fight-crimearticle-1.1799980 (reporting on the NYPD’s consideration of employing drones);
Jan Ransom, Privacy Advocates Take Issue with Police Drone Use, BOSTON
GLOBE (Sep. 25, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/09/25/bostonpolice-purchasing-drones/SAiDlIMlJT4DHaDkBMjHML/story.html (reporting
on the Boston Police Department’s recent purchase of drones); Leif Reigstad, It’s
Official: HPD is Looking Into Using Drones, HOUSTONPRESS.COM (Mar. 11,
2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/news/its-official-hpd-islooking-into-using-drones-8232801 (reporting on the Houston Police
Department’s research into using drones for law enforcement); Lisa RooseChurch, Michigan State Police Shows How It Will Use Drone, DET. FREE PRESS
(Mar.
12,
2015,
2:22
PM),
http://www.freep.com/story/
news/local/michigan/2015/03/12/michigan-state-police-drone/70214866/
(reporting on the Michigan State Police’s press demonstration on how it intends
to use an Unmanned Aircraft System, an Aeryon SkyRanger, for police work in
Michigan).
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police, sheriff, fire, and emergency units [in the United States] have
acquired drones . . . .”9
The use of drone technology in the domestic law enforcement
context brings with it legal issues and challenges equally as complex
as the military’s use of drones.10 I argue that the domestic use of
drones in the law enforcement context brings significantly more
complex legal issues than the use of expeditionary defense drones
because of the enhanced Constitutional protections people in the
United States enjoy.11
The trend towards American police militarization,12 alongside
the increasing autonomy13 of unmanned systems complicate this
issue. Yet it is foreseeable that American domestic law enforcement

9

Dan Gettinger, Public Safety Drones, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE
(Apr. 2017), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/public-safety-drones/.
10
See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES
IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf;
Brumfield, supra note 7, at 556–65 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment (seizure)
and its application in law enforcement’s use of drones); Jenks, supra note 7, at
1403–24 (analyzing the application of the Fourth Amendment to law enforcement
drone use); Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for
Legislatures,
BROOKINGS
(Nov.
2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/
research/drones-and-aerial-surveillance-considerations-for-legislatures/
[hereinafter McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for
Legislatures] (discussing the Fourth Amendment (search) legal implications of
law enforcement drone use); Reid, supra note 7, at 872–74, 887 (discussing the
Fourth Amendment’s application to robotic policing).
11
See supra note 10.
12
See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013); Dan Gettinger & Arthur Holland Michel, Law
Enforcement Robots Data Sheet, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE (2016)
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/law-enforcement-robots-datasheet/ (noting “[t]he rate
of transfers [of drones] to law enforcement agencies has increased from less than
10 transfers each year prior to 2010 to over 200 transfers so far in 2016”); Mark
Nevitt, Why Are We Giving U.S. Police Departments Bayonets?, JUST SECURITY
(Aug.
31,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/44588/giving-u-s-policedepartments-bayonets/.
13
See Capt. Brent D. Sadler, USN, AI Goes to War!, 142 U.S. NAVAL INST.
PROC., Dec. 2016, at 43–47.
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will continue to increase its use of semi- and inevitably14 fully
autonomous devices to execute its mission of public safety and
security. This increased use generally—and with specific regard to
more autonomous systems driven by advancements in artificial
intelligence (“AI”)15—brings with it significant risks without the
development of widely accepted best practices or guidelines that
would optimally help illuminate where, when, and how civilian law
enforcement agencies can best employ these tools while addressing
the risks to individual rights under the law.
Legal scholars have concluded that existing Fourth Amendment
case law likely provides sufficient protections with regard to
American domestic law enforcement’s use of unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) for what could fairly be characterized as “search”
activities, with but minor adjustments to account for (1) true
exigencies and (2) eventually fully autonomous UAS’ potential
greater on-scene time, as compared to manned aviation systems.16 I
concur with that analysis and will not travel too far down that
relatively well-trod ground in this paper.
With regard to the use of force by police robots, I believe that a
scheme which generally creates an inverse relationship between
autonomy and lethality, with a special focus on rapidly developing
non-lethal-use-of-force technology,17 could provide a strong
14

See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 5, at 123–24 (describing the increasing
capabilities of autonomous robots).
15
Scott Rosenberg, Why AI is Still Waiting for Its Ethics Transplant, WIRED
(Nov. 1, 2017, 6:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-ai-is-still-waitingfor-its-ethics-transplant/ (interviewing Kate Crawford, co-founder of the AI Now
Institute and discussing Ms. Crawford’s perception that current standards of AI
ethics are wanting).
16
See Jenks, supra note 7; see also McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance:
Considerations for Legislatures, supra note 10, at 4.
17
See SINGER, supra note 5, at 83 (“Many believe that if a robot is going to
have a weapon, it should be a nonlethal one.”). But see RONALD C. ARKIN,
GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 71 (Chapman & Hall
2009) [hereinafter ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR] (“The application of
nonlethal weaponry—for example, Tasers, sting-nets, foaming agents . . . can also
potentially lead to unintentional lethality. They are sometimes referred to as lesslethal weapons, rather than nonlethal, for that reason.”). See generally NONLETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., http://jnlwp.defense.gov (last
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foundation for an analytical paradigm which would successfully
balance the capabilities that semi- and fully autonomous devices
provide law enforcement with the importance of protecting
important fundamental individual rights. Further, I believe that
applying a strict civil liability standard for lethal use of force errors
committed by autonomous law enforcement devices may help
mitigate public concerns regarding appropriate accountability for
their use.18
This article focuses on the seizure or arrest aspect of domestic
law enforcement. Most of the analysis center on how domestic law
enforcement agencies can optimally leverage the many benefits of
semi-autonomous and fully autonomous devices to better execute
their mission of public safety and security while managing the risks
when these devices inevitably employ force up to and including
deadly force.
Part I provides a general overview of the U.S. military’s history
in employing unmanned systems in the “war on terror.” Part II
frames the terms “robot” and “autonomy,” and sketches out the pros
and cons of law enforcement’s use of robots later in the paper. It
starts by focusing on issues involving law enforcement patrols,
continues by defining and distinguishing between joint and
independent patrols, characterizes three different modes of
employing robots—remotely, semi-autonomously, and fully
autonomously—and concludes by establishing the difference
between tactical police patrols and operational-level patrols. Part III
surveys the existing legal and policy landscape currently applicable
when analyzing U.S. law enforcement’s use of remotely-operated,
semi-autonomous, and more fully autonomous devices. It starts with
visited Nov. 24, 2017) (providing a homepage for the Department of Defense’s
joint non-lethal weapons program).
18
See GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 104–19 (Northeastern Univ. Press 2013); ALEX
CAMPOLO, MADELYN SANFILIPPO, MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD,
AI
NOW
2017
REPORT
(2017),
https://assets.
contentful.com/8wprhhvnpfc0/1A9c3ZTCZa2KEYM64Wsc2a/8636557c5fb14f
2b74b2be64c3ce0c78/_AI_Now_Institute_2017_Report_.pdf (calling for strong
oversight and accountability mechanisms in fielding AI for a wide range of civil
purposes).
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a discussion of constitutional standards of search and seizure, and,
with specific regard to the use of force, discusses how and to what
extent U.S. law marries up to international human rights law on the
subject, while also providing an overview of available domestic
policy guidance on law enforcement use of “drones.” Part IV
analyzes the pros and cons of law enforcement use of remotelyoperated, semi-autonomous and more fully autonomous devices.
Part V includes my recommendations using the framework in Part
II and law and policy in Part III to address the issues identified and
described in Part IV.
II. THE U.S. MILITARY’S USE OF REMOTELY-OPERATED
WEAPONS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR.”
Al Qaeda’s terror attacks against America on September 11,
2001,19 ushered in an era of deployed U.S. military forces that
continues on through today and will likely proceed into the
foreseeable future with American armed forces conducting
operations and fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya,
Yemen,20 and throughout the African continent.21 There have been
many military developments during this extended fight, but none are
as emblematic as America’s use of what may be labeled as

19

See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REP., NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Comm’n],
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
20
See THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL
SECURITY OPERATIONS 6–10 (2016) (providing the domestic and international
legal support for continued U.S. military operations in certain locations overseas).
21
See Dionne Searcey & Eric Schmitt, In Niger, Where U.S. Troops Died, a
Lawless and Shifting Landscape, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/africa/niger-ambush-isis.html
(reporting on a battle involving U.S. special forces that resulted in the deaths of
four U.S. Army members and noting that there were 800 U.S. service members in
Niger and approximately 6,000 spread throughout the African continent).
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automated warfighting systems (AWS) and specifically armed UAS,
more commonly referred to as “drones.”22
There are many reasons why America became “wired” in its war
against terror, and, looking back, it is relatively easy to see how this
occurred.23 AWS—and especially UAS—are the rare force
multiplier in that they help battlefield commanders stake out and
maintain the literal high ground.24 Specifically, they increase
capacity and capabilities in areas critical to warfighting such as
battlefield awareness, surveillance, and reconnaissance.25
Non-human war machines are superior to humans in many
respects. They are inexpensive compared to both their manned
counterparts and individual human soldiers in that they do not need
to be trained, fed, housed, or paid.26 Further, they are not limited by
physical, psychological, or other constraints27 in that “[t]hey don’t
22

See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 5; PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 13;
SINGER, supra note 5, at 19–41; Blank, supra note 5, at 675; Perritt Jr. & Sprague,
supra note 5.
23
See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 18; SINGER, supra note 5, at 215-24; Luke
Dormehl, How Did We Get Here? 9 Major Milestones in the History of Killer
Robots,
DIGITAL
TRENDS
(Nov.
21,
2017,
3:00
AM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/history-of-killer-robots/.
24
See Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31,
2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-10713898
(“[Drones]
provide troops with a 24-hour ‘eye in the sky’, seven days a week. Each aircraft
can stay aloft for up to 17 hours at a time, loitering over an area and sending back
real-time imagery of activities on the ground.”).
25
See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 14–20.
26
See Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons
Systems,
MILITARY
REVIEW,
http://www.armyupress.army.mil/
Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2017/Pros-andCons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017); Luis
Martinez, Pentagon: Fewer Soldiers, More Drones Will Save Money, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/pentagon-fewer-soldiers-dronessave-money/story?id=15448631; Wayne McLean, Drones are Cheap, Soldiers
are Not: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of War, THE CONVERSATION (June 25, 2014,
11:26 PM), https://theconversation.com/drones-are-cheap-soldiers-are-not-acost-benefit-analysis-of-war-27924.
27
See SINGER, supra note 5, at 63–64. But see Luke Dormehl, Watch NASA’s
A.I. Race a Pro Drone Pilot—You’ll Never Guess Who Wins, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Nov. 22, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/nasa-drone-
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get hungry . . . . They’re not afraid. They don’t forget their orders.
They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot[,]”28 and
the commander of an AWS need not write a letter home to a loved
one if it is damaged or falls on the field.29 And as we have learned,
one can mount weapons on them30 in the hopes that they or their
operators can employ those weapons with machine-like precision.31
The U.S. military has fielded a wide variety of stationary,
mobile, and flight-capable, remotely-operated, semi-autonomous,
and fully autonomous armed and unarmed devices.32 Remotelypiloted or autonomous devices of varying degree patrol the
battlefield with human partners, clear explosives, conduct high-risk
entries into opposed locations, provide military leaders and “boots

racing/ (reporting that a human drone piloted defeated an A.I. driven drone in a
series of races, where “humanity came out of the competition as messier but more
creative, whereas the A.I.-powered bot exhibited machine-like precision and
consistency”).
28
SINGER, supra note 5, at 63.
29
Peter Singer, Military Robots and the Future of War, TED,
https://www.ted.com/talks/pw_singer_on_robots_of_war/details (last visited
Nov. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Singer, TED Talk].
30
See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 78–79
(describing the rush to determine the practical and legal feasibility of arming
Predator drones, in the specific context of the hunt for Osama bin Laden); PLAW
ET AL., supra note 5, at 20, 23–25 (describing the arming the Predator and “[t]he
Coming of the Reaper”); SINGER, supra note 5, at 34, 211 (describing that “[t]he
idea then arose to arm the drone by mounting laser-guided Hellfire missiles on the
wings” and noting that “[w]ith Predator, it was almost, ‘Hey we got this thing,
let’s arm it’”).
31
See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 47–48 (providing a table that captures data
from multiple sources describing the ratio of militants to civilian drone strike
casualties and noting a clearly diminishing trend of civilian casualties as U.S.
drone use continued); SINGER, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that when describing
the arming configuration of a land-based robot, “[t]he weapon . . . isn’t cradled in
the soldier’s arms, moving slightly with each breath or heartbeat. Instead it is
locked into a stable platform . . . [thereby] eliminating the majority of shooting
errors” one can expect with a human shooter) (internal quotation omitted); Blank,
supra note 5, at 687, 693.
32
E.g., ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 10–25
(providing an order of robotic battle).
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on the ground” increased situational awareness, and, in some cases,
identify and neutralize threats.33
It is reasonable to presume that the manufacturers of these
devices would no doubt attest that all of these missions translate
neatly into the context of domestic law enforcement.34 As I
previously noted, much has been written about the United States
military’s use of AWS, specifically drones, in fighting the war on
terror.35 Further analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper.
However, it has become increasingly apparent that the use of these
devices has changed warfare forever.36
III. SCOPING LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES INVOLVING “ROBOTS”
AND “AUTONOMY.”
This is not a technical paper, and instead makes several
assumptions to avoid getting bogged down in programming jargon
33

Id.
See Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, The Political and Moral Economies of Dual
Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones, in DRONES AND UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS 46, 56–58 (Ales Zavrsnik ed., Springer Int’l Pub. 2016).
35
See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 5, at 147–75; DRONES AND UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS (Ales Zavrsnik ed., Springer Int’l Pub. 2016); PLAW ET. AL.,
supra note 5, at 13-63; SINGER, supra note 5, at 19–41; Blank, supra note 5; Perritt
Jr. & Sprague, supra note 5; Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal
Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 77 (2013).
36
E.g., PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 287–98 (“Virtually all analysts believe
that the global spread of both unarmed and armed UAVs will only expand
exponentially in the years to come.”) (quoting D. M. Gormley, a senior lecturer
in military affairs at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and
International Affairs); SINGER, supra note 5, at 37 (”[B]y 2008, there were 5331
drones in the U.S. military’s inventory, almost double the amount of manned
planes . . . [and that] given the growth trends, it is not unreasonable to postulate
future conflicts involving tens of thousands.”); Anthony Dworkin, Drones and
Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position, 84 EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. 2–10 (2013) (“Armed drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are now
the United States’ weapons platform of choice in its military campaign against the
dispersed terrorist networks of al-Qaeda . . . [because] [t]hey offer an
unprecedented ability to track and kill individuals with great precision, without
any risk to the lives of the forces that use them, and a much lower cost than
traditional manned aircraft.”).
34
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such as “representational choices” and the advantages or
disadvantages of “if/then” programming as compared to “while”
statements.37 Instead, this paper presumes a near-future state where
sensor, computing, and mobility technology have reached a level of
sophistication where a robot’s ability to “sense-think-act” is near
equal to that of its human counterparts.38 Given this assumption,
there are several foreseeable means in which law enforcement could
employ robots of varying complexity and capability.
U.S. law enforcement already uses specialized robots for
activities like bomb disposal39 and high-risk entry.40 But I believe the
future of robotic policing in the United States lies in what I will
loosely label as “patrol.”41 Patrol largely entails police presence
37

See generally ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17
(outlining the issues, challenges, and opportunities for programming lethal
autonomy in battlefield robots).
38
SINGER, supra note 5, at 67; see also Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of
Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon
Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 379, 392–
97 (2017) [hereinafter Schuller, Crossroads] (describing this ability as “Observe,
Orient, Decide, Act” and detailing each phase).
39
See Michael Wilson, How the Bomb Squad Disabled a Second Explosive in
the
Chelsea
Bombing,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/nyregion/chelsea-bombing-trial.html.
40
E.g., E.B. Boyd, Is Police Use of Force About to Get Worse—With Robots?,
POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2016/09/police-robots-ethics-debate-214273 (“Early Monday morning, FBI
agents and New Jersey police officers used a bomb-squad robot to try to defuse
the makeshift bombs found near a train station in Elizabeth. (The explosives ended
up detonating after police used the machine to try to cut a wire.) Earlier this
month, sheriff’s deputies from Los Angeles used a robot to disarm a violent
suspect who had barricaded himself inside a berm in a Southern California desert.
And last Friday, another robot was used to force doors open as police searched
for a gunman hiding out in an Amtrak train.”).
41
See JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 45 (2d ed.,
Routledge 2015) (noting “[t]he contemporary practice of police patrol, called
random preventive patrol, is based on a philosophy of geographic crime
deterrence” and stating that these patrols, “whose effectiveness is unquestioned in
most police organizations” are anything but random and allow police officers
“many opportunities for proactive police work”); DICTIONARY OF POLICING 188
(Tim Newburn & Peter Neyroud eds. 2008) (defining patrol and noting that
“[t]hrough patrol duties the police perform a number of broad functions, including
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within a specified area to both deter crime and shorten response time
in the event crime occurs.42 Furthermore, when discussing patrol
robots in the context of domestic law enforcement, it will be useful
to further separate their use into several separate interrelated
categories.
A. Independent v. joint patrols.
The first category distinguishes between an independent patrol
as opposed to a joint patrol. In this paper, an independent patrol will
refer to a patrol profile where a robot, remotely-operated or
autonomous, operates alone. Conversely, a joint patrol will refer to
a patrol profile where a robot may operate with a human “partner”
or partners.43 Further, independent patrols may become joint patrols
and vice versa depending upon many factors such as the standard
procedures of the agency in question, the technology available, and
the facts on the ground of the real-time situation involved.44
Additionally, there is a distinction between an independent patrol
and a police unit responding to a specific incident.

the prevention and detection of criminal behavior (sic), the management of public
order problems and traffic occurrences, and the provision of assistance to the
public”).
42
See CRANK, supra note 41, at 43–50.
43
See SINGER, supra note 5, at 132–34 (describing that the likely future first
phase of integrating robots into military and police operations will involve
partnering between humans and robots: “One example . . . is the through-the-door
procedure often used by police and soldiers to enter an urban dwelling . . . [where]
one kicks in the door then pulls back so another can enter low and move left,
followed by an another who enters high and moves right, etc. . . . . [T]he team will
consist of robot platforms working with one or more human teammates as a
cohesive unit.”).
44
See id. at 134 (noting that one expert, David Bruemmer at the Idaho National
Lab, believes that “[o]ver time . . . robots will have ‘dynamic autonomy’ built in,
where the amount of ‘leash’ the robots are given is determined less by any ideal
of keeping humans ‘in the loop’ and more by their human teammate’s experience
and trust level . . . . Trust [in this context refers to] having a proper sense of what
the other is capable of, as well as being correct in your expectations of what the
other will do.”).
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B. Levels of autonomy.
Here, I break down robots into three categories: (1) remotelyoperated; (2) semi-autonomous; and (3) fully autonomous. The first
two categories have a human being well-established “in the loop.”45
It is important to separate these levels because as this technology
begins to take hold and proliferate within domestic U.S. law
enforcement, there should be a generally inverse relationship
between autonomy and lethality.
A remotely-operated robot has a human operator that controls
the device. Its sensors feed information to the operator, and the
operator takes the information from the sensors, maneuvers the
device, and uses whatever tools with which the device is equipped,
to interact with the operating environment. To large extent, a
remotely-operated robot has a human not just “in the loop,” but that
human is deciding how fast to draw the loop, how big the loop is, if
the loop should have a color and what that color should be.
A semi-autonomous robot has a human controller, but the
responsibilities for operating the device are shared between the
human and the robot’s onboard computer.46 For the purposes of this
paper, the real decision point between who should act, the robot or
the human, turns at the point where armed force would be
employed.47 For example, consider a human patrol officer arriving
on the scene of a domestic violence call and deploying a small,
unmanned aviation system from the trunk of her vehicle. Upon
launch, the UAS establishes a real-time video link with an officer
45

See id. at 123–24 (describing the go-to phrase to capture the idea that humans
maintain control over certain robotic operations, but most specifically, the
employment of force and referring to the “observe, orient, decide, act (OODA)”
loop that is used as model to analyze action).
46
See CAPTAIN ANDREW NORRIS, LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO UNMANNED
MARITIME SYSTEMS MONOGRAPH, U.S. NAVAL WAR C. R. 13, 14 (2013);
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 236
(2013); Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Debating Autonomous Weapon
Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1100-1103 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2017).
47
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 46, at 234–36.
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back at the station house, who can monitor the scene and has the
ability to deploy any additional tools aboard the UAS. But the UAS
is “smart” enough to always fly at the optimal distance from its
human partner without any input from the remotely sited human
operator.48 Additionally, this category includes a drone operated by
its human partner on scene.
As for the third category, there are varying degrees of “fully
autonomous” which essentially turn on whether the computer
processor can “learn” from interacting with its environment49 or
merely just react to sensor stimulus.50 This is overlaid by the extent
a human being could prevent the robot from taking some sort of
action after its deployment and again by programming decisions.51
Thus, there are gradients of “full autonomy” within the spectrum of
categories described above.52 When I use the term autonomous, I
assume that the devices will be truly fully autonomous in that they
will not only be able to react to sensor stimuli, but will be able to
adjust their initial and potential future reactions based on that
changing stimuli and without human input, take action in a
timeframe in which it is meaningful for the device to do so.53

48

See Michael Horowitz, The Ethics and Morality of Robotic Warfare, 145
DAEDALUS 25, n.18 (2016) (noting that the U.S. Navy’s prototype X-47B can take
off and land on its own).
49
See Zoe Bernard, So, What Is Machine Learning Anyways? Here’s a Quick
Breakdown,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Nov.
23,
2017,
12:00
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-machine-learning-quick-explainer2017-11; Cade Metz, Building A.I. That Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/technology/machine-learningartificial-intelligence-ai.html (“Neural networks are rapidly accelerating the
development of A.I. Rather than building an image-recognition service or a
language translation app by hand, one line of code at a time, engineers can much
more quickly build an algorithm that learns tasks on its own.”); Cade Metz,
Finally, Neural Networks That Actually Work, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2015, 5:45 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/04/jeff-dean/.
50
See Sadler, supra note 13, at 45; Schuller, supra note 38, at 390–409.
51
See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 46, at 234–36; Schuller, supra note 38,
at 417–20.
52
See Anderson & Waxman, supra note 46, at 1100–03.
53
Id.
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C. Operational54 v. tactical55 patrol.
Robots do not have the same physical or psychological
biological limitations as humans.56 They do not get tired or lose
focus and are generally limited in their length of operation only by
their onboard fuel or power.57 This distinction helps bring the
difference between operational and tactical policing into contrast.
Military planners have long separated and labeled different
levels of warfare.58 While police work is not warfare, the labels the
military uses to describe a layered approach to analyzing objectives
can easily apply in the scope of modern policing and provides a
helpful framing tool.
“The operational level . . . links the tactical employment of
forces to [meet a] . . . strategic objective.”59 Here, that strategic
objective is public safety and security. In the law enforcement
context, operational level leadership and capabilities should or do
inform decision making in “determin[ing] how, when, where, and
for what purpose . . . [tactical-level] forces will be employed, to
influence [a criminal’s] disposition before [police interaction], to
deter . . . [criminal activities], and to assure [the public,] to achieve
[public safety and security].”60 For example, a domestic law
enforcement agency could employ several medium-sized UAS to
provide persistent, real-time surveillance of a wide area of
responsibility so that police leadership better understand the
54

See JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (Jan.
17,
2017),
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf;
Robert Bateman, Understanding Military Strategy and the Four Levels of War,
ESQUIRE (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news
/a39985/four-levels-of-war/.
55
See JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, supra note 54.
56
See supra notes 26–27.
57
SINGER, supra note 5, at 88–89 (describing the various novel ways currently
being developed to power “robots”).
58
See supra note 54.
59
JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, supra note 54.
60
Id.; see also Trevor Mogg, Drones are Helping French Traffic Cops Catch
Hundreds of Dangerous Drivers, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 14, 2017, 11:35 PM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/drones-help-french-traffic-cops/.

OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement

17

environment and can more effectively deploy individual patrol
forces.61 Open and transparent operational-level police work
theoretically also has a deterrent effect on criminal activity by
establishing a sort of wide ranging visible “omnipresence” beyond
the scale provided by individual, tactical-level patrols.62
That leads into the idea that operational-level activities differ
from tactical activities in terms of scope.63 In short, “[t]actics is the
employment, ordered arrangement, and directed action of forces in
relation to each other.”64 In police work, it is the street cop or the
vehicle patrol. Ideally, tactical actions are informed by operational
planning, and in turn tactical patrols feed information to the
operational level so that they can continuously improve in a neverending feedback loop.65
Operational-level use of robot technology, which at its most
basic would cover more ground, brings with it different issues than
those in the previous example of the tactical-level patrol officer
fielding the UAS from the trunk of her patrol cruiser for back up or
support in responding to the domestic violence call.

61

Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to
Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:56 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/
AR2011012204111.html?sid=ST2011012204147 (noting that “[d]rones raise the
prospect of much more pervasive surveillance”) (internal quotations removed);
Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016baltimore-secret-surveillance/ (describing Baltimore’s practice of employing a
small manned aircraft with “wide-angle cameras [capable of capturing] an area
roughly 30 square miles and continuously transmitting real-time images to
analysts on the ground”).
62
John Surico, Omnipresence Is the Newest NYPD Tactic You’ve Never Heard
Of, VICE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vdpq7m/
omnipresence-is-the-newest-nypd-tactic-youve-never-heard-of-1020 (noting that
omnipresence is the “perfect word” to describe NYPD’s patrol strategy of
seemingly being everywhere).
63
See JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, supra note 54.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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IV. LAW AND POLICY OVERVIEW
This section provides an overview of U.S. constitutional search
and seizure law with a brief discussion on how the international
standards for the use of force compare to the U.S. standards. It
concludes with a discussion of U.S. federal law, regulation, and
policy on law enforcement use of drones, along with a survey of
U.S. state law on the subject.
A. Constitutional search requirements.
I will not dwell on the use of remotely piloted, semiautonomous, or fully autonomous drones in the context of
“operational” level police surveillance. Professor Christopher Jenks
of Southern Methodist University’s Dedman School of Law fully
analyzed the existing state of the law in his excellent piece State
Labs of Federalism and Law Enforcement “Drone” Use, published
in the Washington and Lee Law Review in the Summer of 2015.66
Further, Professor Gregory McNeal of Pepperdine University has
also written extensively on the subject.67 However, the following is
a brief summary of the current state of the law.
A “search” is a quest for evidence of criminal wrongdoing by
agents of the government into an area or object in which a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.68 The Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution governs searches.69 It reads:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
66
Jenks, supra note 7, at 1389; see also McNeal, Drones and the Future of
Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7, at 406–08; THOMPSON II, supra note 10, at 4–
17.
67
See McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance, Considerations for
Legislatures, supra note 10 (disfavoring strongly the continued use of the warrant
requirement for police unmanned aerial surveillance); McNeal, Drones and the
Future of Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7.
68
E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting that a Fourth Amendment analysis into search activity requires both a
subjective belief that the subject had an expectation of privacy and an objective
requirement that the expectation be reasonable).
69
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.70

Courts have long held that where people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, searches are only constitutional if they were
supported by an appropriately-issued warrant, based on probable
cause that evidence of a particular crime is in a particular place, at a
particular time.71 Courts, however, have read in exceptions to the
“warrant” requirement to account for “exigencies” or emergencies
where there is a threat to life72 or the destruction of evidence73 and
“plain view” discoveries, where a police officer discovers evidence
of a crime where they are in a place they are otherwise lawfully
entitled to be.74
As American law enforcement agencies became more and more
technologically advanced, largely in response to the so-called waron-drugs, the Supreme Court expanded this plain view exception by
creating an “open view” doctrine that it applied where law
enforcement used aircraft and helicopters to look for evidence of
illegal drug production.75 The Supreme Court found, in a series of
cases, that it was not unconstitutional for police to use information
regarding illegal activity that they discovered without first obtaining
a warrant, while on patrol in an aircraft or helicopter operating
within the navigable airspace above a location because the evidence
of criminal wrongdoing was in open view of the police in the aircraft
or helicopter and that it was not reasonable to have an expectation
70

Id.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
72
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2006); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, 587–88 (1980).
73
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 40 (1963).
74
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well
established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain
view without a warrant.”).
75
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 173–74; THOMPSON II, supra note 10, at 7–8;
McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7, at 373–79
(describing the history of the Supreme Court considering manned aerial
surveillance in the law enforcement context by tracing the path from California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) to Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 239 (1986) to Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989)).
71
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of privacy from observation despite the greater vantage point of the
police provided by that aircraft.76 The Supreme Court reasoned that
the enhanced vantage merely provided a vehicle for the police to use
their normal means of observing criminal activity from an area they
were otherwise authorized to be, but the Court was later unwilling
to extend its acceptance of warrantless searches where the police
used thermal imagery77 or GPS monitoring with a device attached to
a vehicle78 to acquire evidence of criminality, in part because these
methods exceeded human detection capabilities and have the
potential to intrude upon places in which people can reasonably
expect privacy.
B. Constitutional seizure requirements.
Like police searches in the United States, police use of force,
including deadly force, is governed by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, because police use of force is a “seizure.”79 Deadly
force is that force which, based on the circumstances, creates a
“substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.”80 “Generally,
police officers have the authority to use deadly force, to cause the
death of another human being, when their life or the life of another
person is jeopardized.”81 This includes circumstances where police
“have probable cause to believe a [fleeing felon] poses a risk to the
safety of police officers or the community,”82 but that a resort to
force must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.83

76

See supra note 75.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
78
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012).
79
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 553 (1980), reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980).
80
Tim Longo, Defining Instrumentalities of Deadly Force, 27 TOURO L. REV.
261, 271 (2011).
81
Michael J. Palmiotto, Use of Deadly Force, in POLICE USE OF FORCE:
IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 35
(Michael J. Palmiotto ed., 2016).
82
See id. at 39.
83
See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–9.
77
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When police use force, that force must be reasonable and this
requirement extends to all levels of police use of force.84 Further,
Courts assess reasonableness through the lens of what a reasonable
officer on the scene would do, as opposed to applying a post-hoc
standard of reasonableness, and their analysis does not account for
the officer’s underlying intent or motivation, but is instead focused
on the totality of circumstances to which the officer is responding.85
In examining the totality of the circumstances, Courts “must
embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.”86
C. International legal standards on the use of force.
The application of international law to domestic U.S. law
enforcement activities is a subject with little practical effect outside
the realm of academia.87 There are many reasons for this. Some are:
that as a general proposition, international legal paradigms often
lack enforcement mechanisms;88 the United States’ trend away from
strict adherence to international law and treaties and its habit of
attaching Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUD) to
account for the nuances of the American governmental system;89 the
tendency of its courts to read international legal obligations
84

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381–84 (2007).
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
86
Id.
87
See generally Hamilton, Police Robots and the Law, supra note 7, at 4.
88
But see Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
(Jan. 22, 1996), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcinginternational-law.
89
See Willem van Genugten, The United States’ Reservations to the ICCPR;
International Law versus God’s Own Constitution, in THE ROLE OF THE NATIONSTATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 35-46 (M. Castermans-Holleman, F. van Hoof & J.
Smith eds., 1998) (describing the history of the United States’ Reservations to the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)); M.S., Why the
Sheriff Should Follow the Law, ECONOMIST (May 23, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/05/america-andinternational-law.
85
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narrowly;90 its reluctance to be subject to international institutions;91
Federalism concerns;92 and a persistent belief in American
exceptionalism in matters that pertain to the application of
Constitutional law in domestic affairs.93 Regardless, a quick look at
international legal standards for the use of force in domestic law
enforcement will provide some helpful context with the analysis of
law enforcement use of drones and robots later in the paper.
“The use of force in law enforcement operations is mainly
governed by international human rights law . . . [and] [t]he most
relevant rights as regards the use of force in law enforcement is the
right to life.”94 To start, the Supreme Court’s reasonableness
standard is objectively a bit more permissive than the applicable
international legal standard, which authorizes police use of force

90

E.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 182 (1993)
(interpreting U.S. international obligations regarding the protection of refugees
by prohibiting their return to a location where there is danger only being triggered
upon their actual arrival into the United States).
91
See Ben Cardin, The South China Sea is the Reason the United States Must
Ratify UNCLOS, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jul. 13, 2016, 2:30 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/13/the-south-china-sea-is-the-reason-theunited-states-must-ratify-unclos/; Harold Hongju Koh, Dena Adler, Joanna
Dafoe, Peter Posada, Conor Dwyer Reynolds & Eugene Rusyn, Trump’s SoCalled Withdrawal from Paris: Far From Over, JUST SECURITY (June 2, 2017,
8:44 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/41612/trumps-so-called-withdrawalparis/ (describing President Bush’s act of “unsigning” the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court in the context of President Trump’s
attempt to withdraw from the Paris climate accords).
92
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–07 (2008) (holding that while
externally, the United States has international legal obligations to abide by treaties
in which it is a party, only self-executing treaties are enforceable as the law of the
land within the United States).
93
See generally Garrett Epps, Constitutional Myth #10: International Law is a
Threat
to
the
Constitution,
ATLANTIC
(Jul.
28,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/07/constitutional-myth-10international-law-is-a-threat-to-the-constitution/242683/; van Genugten, supra
note 89.
94
The Use of Force in Law Enforcement Operations, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS (Sep. 23, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/use-force-lawenforcement-operations.
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only as a last resort.95 Furthermore, international standards, as
articulated in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (BPUFF), provide that
police may use deadly force in “[s]elf-defence [sic] or defence [sic]
of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury; [to
prevent] the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving
grave threat to life; [to arrest] a person presenting a danger of
perpetrating such a crime and resisting authority, or prevention of
his or her escape.”96 While many U.S. law enforcement agencies
have use-of-force policies that are substantially similar to the
international standards, especially as it pertains to the use of force
in self-defense, including the defense of others, there are slight
differences that may play out factually between the international
standards and what a U.S. court may find as a “reasonable”
application of police force.97
D. Federal law and policy pertaining to law enforcement “drone”
use.
UAS in America are governed federally by the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”), but there is no functionally equivalent
regulatory agency that governs terrestrial remotely-operated or
autonomous devices.98 The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (“FAA Act”)99 included “specific requirements that
government agencies must follow in order to operate a drone” in the
United States, but was silent on armed drones.100 After the FAA Act,
“[t]he FAA and the Department of Justice [(“DOJ”)] created a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to implement a streamlined
training and authorization process to enable [state] law enforcement
agencies to operate [drones] within the United States safely,
95

Id.
Id.
97
See Brumfield, supra note 7, at 567–69.
98
See id. at 550.
99
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2012)
(enacted).
100
Brumfield, supra note 7, at 550–51.
96
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effectively, and lawfully.”101 “The MOU establishes . . .
requirements for a [law enforcement agency] to gain [FAA]
authorization to operate a drone”102 and limits current law
enforcement operations to remotely piloted “drones” within sight of
their operator, in a “defined incident perimeter (‘DIP’)” at an
altitude no higher than 400 feet, during daylight hours only, with no
ability to pursue or fly over groups of people or major roadways.103
Further, DOJ also recently released guidance to DOJ components
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on using
“drones” for law enforcement purposes.104 The DOJ guidance is
largely non-substantive and primarily reiterates broad themes
including the importance of protecting Constitutional rights, the
value of restraint in planning and executing operations involving
drones and UAS, and the importance of both accountability and
transparency in conducting drone operations.105 Additionally, in
2015, President Obama issued a Memorandum outlining his views
on the Federal Government’s use of drones, specifically as they
relate to potential privacy and civil liberties concerns.106

101

Id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
103
See id. at n.69–70 (quoting Memorandum of Understanding between FAA,
UAS Integration Office & The U.S. DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, Nat’l Inst.
Of Justice Concerning Operation of UAS by Law Enforcement Agencies 5, 7
(2013), https://alea.org/images/UAS/DOJ%20FAA%20MOU.pdf).
104
See Department of Justice Policy Guidance Domestic Use of Unmanned
Aircraft
Systems,
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.
(May
22,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/file/441266.
105
Id.
106
See Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9355, 9355–58 (Feb. 15, 2015),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/02/20/2015-03727/promotingeconomic-competitiveness-while-safeguarding-privacy-civil-rights-and-civilliberties-in; see also Gregory S. McNeal, What You Need to Know About the
Government’s Drone Privacy Rules, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015, 1:40 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-arecoming-heres-what-president-obama-thinks-about-privacy/#2eb84a8f3a98.
102

OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement

25

E. Survey of specific state laws that address law enforcement use
of drones and robots.
Regulating drone use is an exceedingly hot topic in state
legislatures, and “[a]t least 38 states were considering legislation
related to UAS [as of] 2017.”107 In 2016:
18 states—Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin . . . passed legislation
requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain a search warrant to use
UAS for surveillance or to conduct a search. One state enacted such
requirements in 2016.108

Vermont went further and prohibited law enforcement’s use of
drones to “investigate, detect, or prosecute crime, or to gather or
retain data on citizens peacefully exercise[ing] their rights of free
speech and assembly.109
Since UAS and drone use became the issue du jour, “[s]ome
states, including Oregon, Virginia and Wisconsin, have outright
banned law enforcement agencies from arming drones.”110
Additionally, “[o]nly North Dakota, so far, has explicitly permitted
police to put weapons on drones, though only with less-than-lethal
munitions, such as tear gas, bean bags and Tasers.”111
107

Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGIS. (Sept. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/ currentunmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx (providing overview of the current
state of State UAS law).
108
2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) State Legislation Update, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
transportation/2016-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-state-legislationupdate.aspx.
109
Id.
110
Boyd, supra note 40; see 2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) State
Legislation Update, supra note 108.
111
Boyd, supra note 40; see also Sidney Fussell, Cops Just Got One Step Closer
to Killing Americans by Drone, GIZMODO (Mar. 31, 2017, 2:52 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/cops-just-got-one-step-closer-to-killing-americans-by-d1793893015 (describing the Connecticut law, “An Act Concerning the Use and
Regulation of Drones,” which “effectively bans weaponized drones for everyone
in the state except police officers, permitting them to use drones equipped with
tear gas, incendiary and explosive devices[,] and remote deadly weapons”)
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The state legislative efforts appear focused on UAS and while
UAS definitely are the proverbial “poster children”112 for the debate
on automated policing, as discussed above, the U.S. military has
made great use of land-based robots and remotely-operated
vehicles113 and indeed, many law enforcement agencies already
employ land-based devices in a wide variety of configurations, for a
wide variety of purposes.114 More are no doubt coming.115 Further,
regardless of whether we are discussing law enforcement use of
land-based or air-based devices, as long as a human is at the controls
and making the decisions, the legal concerns are minimized.116 That
(emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted); Andrew Hazzard, ND House: Nonlethal
Drone Weapons Stay Legal for Law Enforcement, DICKINSON PRESS (Feb. 21,
2017, 7:25 PM), http://www.thedickinsonpress.com/news/4222456-nd-housenonlethal-drone-weapons-stay-legal-law-enforcement; Laura Wagner, North
Dakota Legalizes Armed Police Drones, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 27, 2015, 7:16
PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/27/435301160/ northdakota-legalizes-armed-police-drones; 2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
State Legislation Update, supra note 108.
112
PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 333 (discussing “drones” as the poster children
for targeted killing).
113
See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 10–20
(providing a run-down of land-based robots and autonomous vehicles employed
by the DoD).
114
See Boyd, supra note 40 (“In one case, a SWAT team used a robot to reach
through a window and pull a blanket off of a suicidal person to check whether he
had a weapon. (He didn’t.) In other cases, robots have swept homes for booby
traps, and they’re often used to toss tear gas or pepper spray into rooms, to disable
suspects before officers enter. In the California desert earlier this month, sheriff’s
deputies used a robot to creep up behind the suspect and take away his rifle while
he was distracted by helicopters and police officers yelling at him through
loudspeakers.”).
115
See Mike Murphy, Boston Dynamics is Still Making Creepy Robots Under
SoftBank, QUARTZ (Nov. 13, 2017), https://qz.com/1128469/softbanks-bostondynamics-has-a-new-creepy-dog-like-robot-called-spotmini/.
116
See David A. Graham, The Dallas Shooting and the Advent of Killer Police
Robots,
ATLANTIC
(July
8,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/dallas-police-robot/490478/
(quoting Seth Stoughton, an assistant professor of law at the University of South
Carolina) (“The circumstances that justify lethal force justify lethal force in
essentially every form . . . . If someone is shooting at the police, the police are,
generally speaking, going to be authorized to eliminate that threat by shooting
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is not to say there are none, but I believe the true issues occur when
the role of the human “in the loop” is greatly diminished or
eliminated altogether.117
Though this is not a current issue, I suspect it will be one that we
will need to address on the near horizon. And I am assuming a sort
of “lead-follow” relationship between the military and the police
when it comes to employing remotely-operated and autonomous
devices of varying degrees.118 The military sets the standard and the
technology, and, to the extent it exists, the doctrine flows from the
military to the police.119 Granted, the military and the police have
significantly different core functions,120 but there is some mission
overlap,121 and there is also a long history of coordination on tactics
and equipment transfers between the two.122 Though for now, while
some would argue that the technology currently exists to empower
robots to make deadly force decisions, the military has yet to
publicly acknowledge that it has taken, or that it even intends to take,
the human out of the loop when it comes to employing deadly
force.123 Thus, and leaving aside for the moment the key mission
them, or by stabbing them with a knife, or by running them over with a vehicle.
Once lethal force is justified and appropriate, the method of delivery . . . [is likely
not] legally relevant.”).
117
Id. (noting that once you “[m]ove away from the realm of remote-controlled
devices into the world of autonomous or partially autonomous robots that could
deliver lethal or even non-lethal, force . . . the concerns mount”).
118
See CRANK, supra note 41, at 119. See generally KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR
ENEMIES IN BLUE (3d ed. 2015).
119
Supra note 118.
120
See CRANK, supra note 41, at 118 (“The police, of course, are not a military
unit fighting a war—their principal clients are citizens, and their work is
dominated by petty peace-keeping problems involving rowdy teenagers, angry
spouses and neighbors, and other persistent social problems.”).
121
See, e.g., Gary Cordner & Kathryn Scarborough, Information Sharing:
Exploring the Intersection of Policing with National and Military Intelligence, 6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 5–11, 14–15 (Jan. 2010),.
122
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 114–15; WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 323–
24.
123
E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems
(DoD
2012),
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf
(noting that it is DoD policy that “[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon
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distinctions between the law enforcement and military activities, it
is reasonable to conclude that domestic police will not consider
taking the human out of the loop in deadly force scenarios until the
military has done so first.
V. THE TENSIONS INVOLVED WITH POLICE USE OF REMOTELYOPERATED, SEMI-AUTONOMOUS, AND FULLY AUTONOMOUS
TECHNOLOGY IN DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT.
As is the case with most things, police use of remotely-operated,
semi-autonomous, and fully autonomous technology to execute
their mission has both benefits and risks.
A. What are the benefits?
The primary benefits of police use of remotely-operated, semiautonomous, and fully autonomous technology to execute their
mission are increased capacity and improvements to their
capabilities.
1. Increased capacity.
The first benefit of the trend toward more automated police work
is that it will likely increase law enforcement agencies’ capacity by
allowing them to better stretch their operational budgets.124 This is
an “efficiency” benefit. When assessing operational costs of robotic
or drone police devices, factors such as size, capabilities, and
complexity will likely be relevant. One can also imagine a sliding
scale of cost with remotely-operated devices at the lower end, semiautonomous devices in the middle, and fully autonomous devices at
the high end.125
systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force”).
124
See Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 26, at 72-73 (noting that in the military
context, there are long-term savings that could be achieved through fielding an
army of military robots); John Seewer, Drones Become Crime Fighting Tool, But
Perfection
is
Elusive,
WASH.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/3/drones-become-crimefighting-tool-but-perfection-i/.
125
See Gabriel Nica, Level 5 Autonomous Technology Not Possible Yet, Claims
BMW, BMW BLOG (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.bmwblog.com/2017/10/05/level-
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Further, “operational level” devices will likely cost more than
“tactical” devices. For example, a large flying device that can
engage in “operational” patrolling for long periods of time will
likely cost more than a small flying device intended for tactical
patrolling with or in support of a human officer because of the size
and complexity of the operational device as compared to the tactical
device.126 This is, of course, not a rule, in that one can also imagine
a more complex tactical device that would need more advanced
programming because it would be more likely to interact with the
public,127 especially if that tactical device were capable of employing
force, deadly or otherwise.
Currently, while it is clear that police agencies around the
country are increasing both the quantity and quality of the robots
and drones in their inventories, these devices still remain relatively
costly.128 As is the case with most technologies, though, these costs
will likely diminish over time,129 especially if America begins
winding down its expeditionary military activities, which will
inevitably result in a stockpile of gear available for transfer to law
enforcement agencies under the so-called federal 1033 program,
which I discuss in more detail below.130 Thus, in the near future,
purchasing a robot or drone will generally be cheaper or provide
5-autonomous-technology-not-possible-yet-claims-bmw/ (describing a variable
pricing scheme based on autonomy level in the context of autonomous vehicles).
126
Compare PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 24 (calculating that a Predator drone
costs approximately $5 million per unit), with David Hernandez, San Diego
County Sheriff’s Department Expands Drone Program, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 30,
2017),
http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/San-Diego-County-SheriffsDepartment-Expands-Drone-Program.html (reporting that it costs the San Diego
police department $125,000-$165,000 per year to operate their drone program
using “the same kind [of drones] found on the shelves at any electronics store”).
127
See IBM Watson, IBM Watson: How it Works, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Xcmh1LQB9I.
128
See Gettinger, supra note 9.
129
See SINGER, supra note 5, at 130.
130
See
generally
Mission,
DEF.
LOGISTICS
AGENCY,
http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/About/Mission.aspx (last visited Aug.
12, 2018) (noting that as “[p]art of the Defense Logistics Agency, DLA
Disposition Services disposes of excess property received from the military
services”).
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better value than training and paying a human patrol officer.131 That
will either free up scarce fiscal resources through more efficient
operations or drive increases in police effectiveness by increasing
the amount of law enforcement resources available for deployment
within the municipality.132
The increase in the value of capacity logically relates to the level
of autonomy. At the tactical level, a remotely piloted robot doesn’t
save a “body,” it merely transfers the body from the patrol forces
walking a beat to the division in the police department operating the
drone.133 This is especially true under the FAA’s existing guidelines,
which require that a remotely-piloted drone remain within sight of
its operator.134 The same would hold true for a semi-autonomous unit
that can maneuver itself, but would depend on a human for more
complex interactions like employing force. Thus, assuming
efficiencies through a human support staff that can manage multiple
tactical autonomous robots beyond a 1:1 ratio, only full autonomy
optimizes increased capacity at the tactical level.135 A fully
autonomous robot engaged in tactical-level police work saves
resources by replacing the human officer, while a fully autonomous
131

Sabrina Cupit, Police in Metro Atlanta Buzzing About Drones, WSB RADIO
(May 31, 2017, 8:31 PM), http://www.wsbradio.com/news/local/police-metroatlanta-buzzing-about-drones/17qHTrzRMkyP59FSwLmQxM/ (reporting that
police in the Atlanta metro area are claiming that drones are being used “very
effectively,” so much so, that “they could replace staff people in areas that are
monitoring crowd controls”).
132
See Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 26.
133
See Jack R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, Community-Based Policing and Foot
Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR
REALITY 195–223 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988).
134
See Brumfield, supra note 7, at 553 n.69–70.
135
See Anderson & Waxman, supra note 46, at 1101 (“In some cases, a human
operator might control only a single or very few sets of sensor and weapon units.
In others, he or she might control or oversee an integrated network of many sensor
and weapon units, which might operate largely autonomously, though with the
supervisor able to intervene with respect to any of the weapon units.”); see also
SINGER, supra note 5, at 75 (“The more autonomy a robot has, the less human
operators have to support it. As one Pentagon report put it, ‘Having a dedicated
operator for each robot will not pass the common sense test.’ If robots don’t get
higher on the autonomy scale, they don’t yield any cost or manpower savings.”).
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robot that is sophisticated enough to operate independently may
result in a savings of two officers, in jurisdictions that still deploy
officers in pairs.136 There are also savings in that it is safe to assume
that robotic officers will be able to work beyond the normal eighthour shifts most human police officers work.137 Again, they do not
get tired, bored, or hungry, and so the fully autonomous robotic
officer works more efficiently than its human counterpart.138
At the operational level, there may be greater capacity increases
depending upon the capabilities of the operational drone or robot.
Take, for example, a comparison to a large metropolitan police
department’s aviation unit.139 A fixed wing UAS will likely have
greater operational range and longevity than a manned rotary wing
helicopter.140 Also, assume that the UAS support staff is equal to or
136

See Tom Jackman & Peter Hermann, Police Nationwide Order Officers to
Ride in Pairs After Dallas Police Ambush, WASH. POST (Jul. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-police-boost-patrolsafter-snipers-in-dallas-kill-five-officers-wound-others/2016/07/08/9595063a4508-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html?utm_term=.e62ebd98626b;
Christina Sterbenz, Police Around the Country are Making a Complicated Call to
Increase Officer Safety in the Wake of Dallas and Baton Rouge, BUS. INSIDER
(Jul. 19, 2016, 7:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/problems-of-policeworking-in-pairs-2016-7.
137
See generally SINGER, supra note 5, at 62–65.
138
Id.
139
See LAPD Air Support Unit, POLICE HELICOPTER PILOT,
http://www.policehelicopterpilot.com/lapd-air-support/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2017); New York Police Department Aviation Division, POLICE HELICOPTER
PILOT, http://www.policehelicopterpilot.com/nypd-aviation-unit/ (last visited
Nov. 22, 2017).
140
Compare Praveen Duddu, The 10 Longest Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), AIR FORCE TECH. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.airforcetechnology.com/features/featurethe-top-10-longest-range-unmanned-aerialvehicles-uavs/ (describing UAS range, in some cases measured by days), with Bell
429, BELL HELICOPTER, http://www.bellhelicopter.com/commercial/bell-429
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017) (claiming a 411 nautical mile range and 4.5 hours of
endurance), and R44 Raven II Police Helicopter, ROBINSON HELICOPTER,
https://robinsonheli.com/r44-police-helicopter-specifications/ (claiming a 300
nautical mile range), and R66 Turbine Police Helicopter, ROBINSON HELICOPTER,
https://robinsonheli.com/r66-police-helicopter-specifications/ (claiming a 325
nautical mile range).
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less than what is required to maintain manned helicopter capability.
For argument’s sake, then, let us say that a medium-sized UAS has
a twelve-hour effective flight time141 and is equipped with cameras
and sensors powerful enough to allow it to cover the entire
municipality five times on patrol mode during that 12-hour flight.142
The law enforcement agency has three UAS, and it rotates them
through so it keeps one on, leaves one in stand-by, and has one off
for maintenance.143 In one day, the UAS would orbit the
municipality ten times and gather information that would take
multiple 3-4 hour helicopter sorties and hundreds of vehicle or foot
patrols to acquire. If it is remotely piloted, it does so at the cost of
its one pilot and shared support staff. If it is semi-autonomous and
doesn’t have a mission profile which requires a human operator, or
if fully autonomous, it only requires its support staff.
2. Improved capabilities.
The second benefit is the increased capabilities autonomous
police devices provide. This is essentially an “effectiveness” benefit.
In many cases, even on the battlefield, robots—remotely-operated
or autonomous devices—merely provide a vehicle for enhanced
sensors or weapons delivery for their human masters.144 Often, these

141

See Duddu, supra note 140.
See supra note 61.
143
See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 24 tbl.1 (noting that for $20 million, a
typical Predator system comes with four aircraft).
144
See generally GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 551 (2d ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2016) (quoting Heeyong Daniel Jang, The Lawfulness of
and Case for Combat Drones in the Fight Against Terrorism, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J.
1, 12 (2013) and describing the sensor set up on modern military drones:“[T]he
Multi-Spectral Targeting System (‘MTS-B’) . . . integrates an infrared sensors, a
color/monochrome video camera, an image-intensified video camera, a laser
designator, and a laser illuminator . . . .”); Anthony M. DeStefano, Sensors,
Scanners Shed Light on Terror Attack Suspect’s Movements, NEWSDAY (Nov. 1,
2017, 9:26 PM), https://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/nyc-terror-suspecttimeline-1.14716803 (reporting how a vast sensor net in Manhattan helped local
police investigate a terror attack and noting that “the ubiquitous array of sensors
and photographic scanners posted throughout the city . . . [gave] cops near-instant
access to the movements of any vehicle”).
142
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sensors exceed human levels.145 Thermal imagers can detect heat,146
sometimes even through solid objects.147 Zoom lenses can provide
fine details at distance.148 Digital, near-infrared imaging allows
machine vision to see beyond the human visual spectrum.149
“Sniffers” of various types can detect chemical traces of explosives
or narcotics.150 Auditory microphones can pick up high octave and
low octave sounds or extend the auditory detection range beyond
what a normal human can hear.151
145

See SINGER, supra note 5, at 63 (writing that UAS and manned aircraft are
different because the UAS “has EO/IR/SARS [electro-optical, infrared, and
synthetic-aperture radar sensors] to rely on. The pilot has the Mark I Eyeball”).
146
See Nicholas Filipas, Stockton Police Get Set to Have Eyes in the Sky,
RECORDNET.COM (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:31 PM), http://www.recordnet.com/news/
20171115/stockton-police-get-set-to-have-eyes-in-sky (reporting that a local
police department in Stockton, CA will be fielding a remotely piloted drone
equipped with heat sensors).
147
See Trevor Pott, Peekaboo Drones and Edge Computing, VIRTUALIZATION
& CLOUD REV. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://virtualizationreview.com/articles
/2017/11/01/peekaboo-drones-and-edge-computing.aspx (reporting on a
prototype drone equipped with technology that allows it to use WiFi signals to see
moving humans behind walls).
148
See Zachariah Hughes, Police Hope to Launch Drones Over Anchorage—
With Limits, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.ktoo.org/
2017/11/17/police-hope-launch-drones-anchorage-limits/ (reporting that a
proposed law enforcement drone’s “[o]verhead cameras can reduce search times
for missing [people and for] [d]ocumenting a crime scene” but also that there may
be “tactical applications when . . . responding with a SWAT team”).
149
See Lindsay Grant, Near-Infrared Imaging Enables Machine-Vision
Advances,
SENSORS
ONLINE
(Oct.
27,
2017,
12:00
AM),
https://www.sensorsmag.com/components/near-infrared-imaging-enablesmachine-vision-advances.
150
Compare Stacy Liberatore, The Drug and Bomb Sniffing Drone that can
Detect Dangerous Chemicals from 1.8 Miles Away, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 15, 2016,
7:06 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3940206/The-drugbomb-sniffing-drone-detect-dangerous-chemicals-1-8-MILES-away.html
(describing a laser-based “sniffing” system), with Sarah Goncalves, Drone of the
Week: ‘Bomb-Sniffing’ UAVs Can Detect Nuclear Weapons, ECN (May 10, 2016,
3:35 PM), https://www.ecnmag.com/blog/2016/05/drone-week-bomb-sniffinguavs-can-detect-nuclear-weapons (describing a system that relies on neutronbased nitrogen activation).
151
See Ashley Forest & Christy Wilcox, LVMPD Deploys Acoustic Technology
to
Assist
with
Crime
Fighting,
KSNV
(Nov.
16,
2017),
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Further, robots tend to be more resistant and resilient to kinetic
damage than human beings.152 In short, they take a beating better,153
and, therefore, their use can decrease the risk to actual humans.154
Again, robots will likely provide increased on-scene time because
they do not share the human need to eat, rest, and remove waste, nor
do they get bored, lose focus, or get scared.155
These increased capabilities manifest in the law enforcement
context in several key ways. First, regardless of whether we are
discussing a remotely-operated or autonomous device, having the
potential for fielding increased full-spectrum sensory capabilities
allows law enforcement to be more effective at working crime
scenes, gathering and preserving evidence,156 and establishing a
better awareness of the environment at both the tactical and
operational levels. Second, tactically, police units already make
great use of robots in high-risk situations involving explosives and

http://news3lv.com/news/local/lvmpd-clark-county-deploys-acoustictechnology-to-assist-with-crime-fighting (“ShotsSpotter is an acoustic
technology that consists of audio sensors that detect, locate, and alert local law
enforcement of gunfire incidents in real time. In no more than 45 seconds from
the actual gun discharge, the alert and the precise location of the event is delivered
to the police.”).
152
See Charles Q. Choi, Damaged Robot Can ‘Heal’ Itself in Less Than 2
Minutes, LIVE SCIENCE (May 27, 2015, 1:37 PM), https://www.livescience.com/
50988-damaged-robot-heals-itself.html; Duncan Graham-Rowe, Robot Spy can
Survive
Battlefield
Damage,
NEWSCIENTIST
(Aug.
20,
2003),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4075-robot-spy-can-survive-battlefielddamage/.
153
See Daniel H. Wilson, Robots are Tougher Than You, Part 1: The Deep Sea,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/gadgets/a4488/4212397/.
154
See Jason Koebler, The Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Letting Police
Kill Suspects With Robots, VICE (July 9, 2016, 9:30 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8q8m93/dallas-shooting-bombrobot-legal-analysis (asking “[i]f the technology exists to allow police officers to
do their jobs more safely, why wouldn’t [we] employ the use of robots”).
155
See SINGER, supra note 5.
156
See Sandra Parrish, Police Drone Aids Accident Investigations, WSB RADIO
(Aug. 18, 2016, 8:29 PM), http://www.wsbradio.com/news/police-drone-aidsaccident-investigations/ejhL7IpBPJnj4D0Z4PDeRP/.
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opposed or barricaded entries,157 and--save for the Dallas incident
described above--have managed to do so without having to resort to
deadly force. In the event of a terror attack, mass shooting like the
Dallas event, or the October 1, 2017 tragedy in Las Vegas,158
employing remotely-operated or autonomous devices will minimize
the risk to police officers and, perhaps, the public because of the
absence of physiological or psychological impacts of the responding
“officer,” improved ability to survey the scene to develop better
situational awareness, and the likely increased precision in the
employment of force.159

157

See Iannelli, supra note 8 (noting that the Miami Beach PD drone use policy
“authorize[s] vaguer usage for ‘tactical deployment’ in ‘emergency situations’
where there’s ‘imminent danger’”); see also Miami-Dade Police Department
Draft Drone Standard Operating Procedures, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/document/miami-dade-pd-draft-drone-standard-operatingprocedures (last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (posting what purports to be the “Miami
Dade Police Department Special Patrol Bureau/Aviation Unit Micro Air Vehicle
(MAV) Standard Operating Procedures”).
158
See Mark Berman, Las Vegas Gunman Shot Security Guard Minutes Before
Massacre,
Police
Say,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/10/09/las-vegasgunman-shot-security-guard-minutes-before-massacre-policesay/?utm_term=.222cfa2d2eee (reporting on the Oct. 1, 2017 mass shooting that
left 58 dead and hundreds wounded in Las Vegas, NV).
159
Compare Conor Friedersdorf, How Two Police Drones Saved a Woman’s
Life, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2018/02/police-drones/553406/ (reporting on an event in Virginia where
the use of two police drones facilitated the non-lethal apprehension of an armed
subject, who would likely have been shot by police during her apprehension but
for the use of the drones), with Vivian Wang, Video Shows Daniel Shaver
Pleading for His Life Before Being Shot by Officer, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/us/police-shooting-video-arizona.html
(reporting on a police camera video of officers in Maricopa County that were
obviously under a great deal of stress when encountering a subject they believed
as potentially hostile, but ultimately unarmed, then shooting and killing the
suspect for his failure to strictly abide by police commands to keep his hands
visible).
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Finally, the police shootings in Ferguson, Missouri,160 and St.
Louis, Missouri,161 and questionable police use of force in
Baltimore, Maryland,162 and Staten Island, New York,163 have
brought to light concerns regarding the impact of bias, either
unconscious or intentional, on the part of American police when
specifically dealing with African-American subjects. This is a
complex issue that rates its own scholarly writing,164 but it is
important to note, again, that autonomous police are not human and
could (and should) be programmed with objective patrol and
operational criteria that would likely greatly minimize the potential
for pretext and bias, conscious or otherwise, in police work.165
160

See generally Michael Brown’s Shooting and Its Immediate Aftermath in
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/08/12/us/13police-shooting-of-black-teenager-michael-brown.html.
161
See generally Tim O’neil & Mitch Smith, Former St. Louis Officer, Jason
Stockley, Acquitted in Shooting of Black Driver, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/us/jason-stockley-anthony-lamar-smithst-louis-officer.html.
162
See generally Rebecca R. Ruiz, Baltimore Officers Will Face No Federal
Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/freddie-gray-baltimore-police-federalcharges.html.
163
See generally Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, Records Leak in Eric Garner
Case Renews Debate on Police Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/nyregion/nypd-eric-garner-danielpantaleo-disciplinary-records.html.
164
See generally Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of
Black-White Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop-And-Frisk
Program, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 315 (2015); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue:
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with
Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn, Joel S. Steele,
Jean M. McMahon & Greg Stewart, How Suspect Race Affects Police Use of
Force in an Interaction Over Time, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 117 (2017); Clayton
Mosher & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Methodological Issues in Biased Policing
Research with Applications to the Washington State Patrol, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 769 (2012).
165
See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 29–36
(describing lack of emotion as one advantage that machines have over humans in
lethal decision making). But see CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 18, at 13–20
(describing how bias can work its way into computer programs, especially where
programmers are not diverse); Rosenberg, supra note 15.

OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement

37

Furthermore, when operating in a joint patrol tactically—or even
independently at the operational level—semi-autonomous and fullyautonomous police robots could provide valuable and ostensibly
neutral and objective evidence where human police allegedly exceed
their mandate to protect and serve by violating individual rights or
inappropriately using force, in much the same way police body
cameras are intended.166
B. What is the downside or risk?
While there are certainly advantages to law enforcement fielding
drones and robots of varying levels of sophistication and autonomy,
these advantages may be offset by several inherent shortfalls or
risks.
1. Robots, even those operated by people, are not human.
There is a qualitative aspect to effective police work beyond
merely responding to crime.167 Most, if not all, police departments
recognize the value of “community policing” and practice at least
some form of it, which is heavily centered on police officers placing
a priority on teaming up and coordinating with the communities they
serve.168 While generally resource-intensive and recently disfavored
in New York City’s now-widespread computer generated crime
statistic-centric strategy,169 community policing is making a
comeback in the post-9/11 era of “intelligence-driven” police
work.170 Essentially, police departments have rediscovered the value
166

See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera
Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 947–50 (2017); Mindy Lawrence, Lights,
Camera, Action: The Age of Body Cameras in Law Enforcement and the Effects
of Implementing Body Camera Programs in Rural Communities, 91 N.D. L. REV.
611, 616–18 (2016) (describing the benefits of police use of body cameras).
167
See Greene & Taylor, supra note 133.
168
See JOHN M. RAY, RETHINKING COMMUNITY POLICING 109 (LFB Scholarly
Pub. 2014) (“By the mid-1990s, nearly every major police department in the U.S.
claimed to be practicing some sort of community policing.”); WILLIAMS, supra
note 118, at 204 (“Philosophically, community policing is characterized by the
solicitation of citizen input, the broadening of the police function, and the attempt
to find solutions based on the value of the local community.”).
169
See RAY, supra note 168, at 139–45.
170
Id. at 143–45.
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of the beat cop working closely within a particular community to
both leverage that community’s leaders and members in preventing
crime and helping gain information through these “networks of
community partnerships.”171 As a result, “[t]he activity of patrol
remains a central component of modern policing systems and
(particularly in respect of calls for a more wholehearted return to
walking beats) is an enduring theme in popular discourses about the
preferred future direction of policing.”172
Thus, there was always and remains value in human interaction
and community policing. It is fair to identify that robots, remotelyoperated, or otherwise, will almost certainly be less capable than
humans in this regard.173 Furthermore, the temptation to employ
technology, such as broad sweeping sensors to offset this
shortcoming, could serve to decrease police effectiveness because
doing so could reduce the trust between the police and their
communities critical to the successful implementation of
community policing.174

171

Id.
DICTIONARY OF POLICING, supra note 41, at 189.
173
See Reid, supra note 7, at 879–81 (noting that robotic police will almost
certainly have “less people skills and common sense than human officers, and it
is unclear how they will handle tense situations”). See generally Greene & Taylor,
supra note 133 (analyzing the value of the police foot patrol in effective police
work and noting that police officers in vehicles “cannot carry out the order
maintenance function as effectively as officers who have greater community
attachments, either through foot patrol or other community contacts. . . . This
enhanced community sensitivity [of foot patrol officers] makes a successful
resolution of incidents more likely[,] . . . lowers fear because there is more
community exposure to police officers[,] . . . [and makes] people feel safer.”).
Thus, it stands to reason that if human police in cars are less effective at
establishing community relations than human police walking a beat, a robot
officer would be that much more ineffective.
174
See Timothy N. Oettmeier & Lee P. Brown, Developing a NeighborhoodOriented Policing Style, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 127–
28 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988); Kate Mather & Cindy
Chang, LAPD Gets an Earful from the Public on UAS Use, POLICEONE.COM
(Aug.
24,
2017),
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/PoliceDrones/articles/413735006-LAPD-gets-an-earful-from-the-public-on-UAV-use/.
172
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2. Increased technological capabilities often outstrip existing legal
checks, especially when used by law enforcement.
Rapidly-increasing technology always seems to exceed legal
protections.175 This has been at least as true in the context of
domestic law enforcement as it has been in nearly every other
context.176 Over the years, advancements in surveillance
technologies,177 transportation,178 weapons, and even the
accumulation and accessibility of data179 have changed how
domestic law enforcement conducts business. Invariably, law
enforcement seems to serve as “early adopters” to leverage
burgeoning technology to gain an edge of the criminals they
pursue.180 Yet our Courts have sometimes found that the police go
175

E.g., Steven Groves, A Manual Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2016),
http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/manual-adapting-the-law-armedconflict-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems (“It is axiomatic that technological
advances often outpace the law.”).
176
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that
warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment). But see Smith v.
Maryland, 434 U.S. 159, 168–69 (1977) (holding that installing and using a pen
register to record telephone numbers dialed from a phone did not require a
warrant).
177
See generally Kyllo v. Unites States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
178
See THOMPSON II, supra note 10, at 7–8; McNeal, Drones and the Future of
Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7, at 374–78 (describing the history of the
Supreme Court considering manned aerial surveillance in the law enforcement
context by tracing the path from California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)
to Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) to Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989)).
179
See Benjamin Mueller, Police Add Civilians in Bid to Better Analyze, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/nyregion/newyork-police-civilians-analyze-crime-data.html (reporting that the NYPD is hiring
employees, optimally with “a combination of law enforcement and math and
statistics backgrounds, [who] will be expected to find crime patterns before they
grow too large and to make the department’s vast amounts of crime data easier to
decipher”).
180
Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, Brooklyn Judge’s Ruling Raises Bar for
Cover
Cellphone
Tracking,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
15,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/nyregion/brooklyn-judge-stingraycellphone-tracking.html?_r=0 (reporting that a New York judge ruled that that the

40

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 1

too far when they apply technology without first fully considering
constitutional protections or to circumvent those protections.
For example, in United States v. Kyllo, the Supreme Court
examined the issue of whether a federal law enforcement agent
could use a crude thermal imager, from the street, to determine
whether a suspect was growing marijuana inside his home, without
first obtaining a warrant.181 The Court held that the use of such a
device, even one that merely measured and visually displayed
temperature differences, to pierce the privacy one is entitled to when
within the home was not reasonable without first getting a warrant,
and, as such, was unconstitutional.182
In United States v. Jones,183 the Supreme Court examined police
use of a GPS to monitor the movements of a drug suspect, again
without a warrant. The Court held in favor of Jones using a trespassbased analysis, but concurring opinions by Justices Alito and
Sotomayor touched on the non-trespass issue of whether persistent
surveillance that tracked the movements of a person around the
clock violates a fundamental right of privacy, and would be as such,
unreasonable without first pursuing a warrant.184
The Court did not squarely address the issue of the
reasonableness of persistent surveillance squarely in Jones but did
hold that the Government needed a warrant to pursue more than six
days’ worth of a subject’s cellular telephone cite records in
Carpenter v. United States.185
NYPD’s warrantless use of a cell tower simulator to track the movements of a
murder suspect via his cell phone was unreasonable).
181
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
182
Mueller & Baker, supra note 180.
183
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402, 404–06 (2012).
184
See id. at 412-13.
185
U.S. v. Carpenter, 585 U.S. 19 (2018); see Will Baude, Carpenter v. United
States and the Positive Law Model, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/21/
carpenter-v-united-states-and-the-positive-law-model/?utm_term=
.1c0291292649; David Kravets, Supreme Court’s New Term: Surveillance,
Hacking, Sports Betting—And Cake, Too, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 2, 2017, 6:00
AM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/supreme-courts-new-termsurveillance-hacking-sports-betting-and-cake-too.
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Finally, a court in New York recently excluded some evidence
that the NYPD gathered against a murder suspect that they obtained
by using a cellular tower simulator to track the subject without a
warrant.186 The device “essentially tricks nearby cellphones by
acting like a cellphone tower and intercepting a phone’s signal . . .
[and can] capture texts, calls, emails and other data.”187 “[T]he
ACLU has found that at least 72 [law enforcement] agencies in 24
states and Washington D.C . . . . [along with Federal agencies like]
the FBI, ICE, [and the] IRS . . . use [such simulators].”188 Indeed,
“the NYPD has said that it used them 1,016 times between 2008 and
May 2015.”189
Robotic policing poses similar risks as those described above.
Courts have yet to provide any directly on-point guidance describing
the constitutional limits of the use of artificial patrol police, despite
law enforcement agencies around the country using or preparing to
use such technology.190 Further, the concerns identified by the Court
in Kyllo and Jones are particularly poignant here, given the clear
application of enhanced imagery technology and persistent
surveillance to robotic policing.191
Use of force by robotic police brings the same concerns, given
the reasonableness standard courts employ in analyzing police use
of force and the context driven, factually specific foundations
behind that standard.192 Indeed, what is a reasonable application of
186

See People v. Gordon, 58 Misc. 3d 544, 545–49, 68 N.Y.S.3d 306, 307–09
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017); Mueller & Baker, supra note 180.
187
Id.
188
Mallory Locklear, Judge Rules NYPD Needed a Warrant Before Using CellSite Simulator, ENGADGET (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/
2017/11/16/judge-rules-nypd-needs-warrant-cell-site-simulator/.
189
Id.
190
See Jenks, supra note 7, at 1421–24; Michaelle Bond, Drones Give Law
Enforcement a New Edge, But Raise Concerns, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 10, 2015,
1:07
AM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/20150810_Drones
_give_law_enforcement_a_new_edge__but_raise_concerns.html.
191
See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–18 (2012)
(Sotomayor J., concurring); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–35 (2001).
192
See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–82 (2007); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).

42

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 1

robotic police use of force, where a remotely-operated device will
present its operator with less sensory input193 and a more
autonomous device will both perceive its environment differently
than a human and then decide to act using exclusively quantitative
analysis?194
3. Inherent existential personal195 and species risk196 posed by
autonomous machines/AI and the value of relative certainty of
action.197
The threat of a killer robot revolution has been a hallmark of
popular fiction for many years.198 Indeed, recently the noted
193

See Breshears, supra note 7, at 205–07.
See Reid, supra note 7, at 880 (“All the machines have done is to self learn
for problems where the goals are clear and quantifiable.”).
195
See, e.g., BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982) (asking whether androids
dream of electric sheep and can a robot be more human than human); RUNAWAY
(TriStar Pictures 1984) (chasing killer robot spiders controlled by Gene Simmons’
villain); THE INCREDIBLES (Pixar Animation Studios/Walt Disney Pictures 2004)
(plotting to attack the city with killer robots that ultimately revolt); 2001: A SPACE
ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) (pleading “open the pod bay doors,
HAL!”).
196
See, e.g., DANIEL H. WILSON, ROBOPOCALYPSE (Double Day Pub. 2011)
(fictionalizing a robot apocalypse); AVENGERS: AGE OF ULTRON (Marvel
Studios/Walt Disney Pictures 2015) (threatening the Avengers, super powered
defenders of humanity that “[t]here is only one path to peace . . . your extinction”);
THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) (introducing the world to “Neo,” the chosen
one, who will free humanity from the chains of bondage of their robot overlords);
THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984) (warning “[t]hat the Terminator[, a killer
robot,] is out there. It can’t be bargained with. It can’t be reasoned with. It doesn’t
feel pity, or remorse, or fear. And it absolutely will not stop, ever, until you are
dead!”); WARGAMES (United Artists 1983) (asking ominously “would you like to
play a game?”).
197
But see Max Tegmark, How to Make AI the Best Thing to Happen to Us,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 8, 2017, 2:51 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2017/10/08/555044340/how-to-make-ai-thebest-thing-to-happen-to-us.
198
In Reid, supra note 7, at 883–85, the author provides a history of robots and
AI in fiction, but neglects the excellent Battlestar Galactica reboot, which
covered all manner of legal issues in through the lens of a robot revolution. “The
cylons were created by man. They evolved. They rebelled. There are many copies.
And they have a plan.” Battlestar Galactica: Scattered (Syfy television broadcast
July 15, 2005).
194
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technologist Elon Musk brought the issue to the forefront by posting
to Twitter that he believed advancements in AI posed an existential
threat to humanity in response199 to a speech by Russian prime
minister Vladimir Putin, who himself intimated that the first nation
to master AI marked the next great opportunity to become the ruler
of the world.200 Soon after, Musk also collaborated with over 100
technology experts in urging the United Nations to address
autonomous weapons, noting that “[o]nce developed, they will
permit armed conflict to be fought at a scale greater than ever, and
at time[s] scales faster than humans can comprehend.”201 Notably,
the renowned physicist Stephen Hawking202 and the neuroscientist
and philosopher Sam Harris also share Musk’s concerns.203 Yet
many others believe that “we are a long way from having the
computing power or developing the algorithms needed to achieve

199

See supra notes 194–95; Sean Illing, The Rise of AI is Sparking an
International Arms Race, VOX (Sept. 13, 2017, 8:20 AM),
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/13/16287892/elon-musk-putin-artificialintelligence-war; James Titcomb, Artificial Intelligence is Bigger Threat to
Civilization than North Korea, Elon Musk Claims, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2017,
2:07
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/09/04/artificialintelligence-bigger-threat-civilisation-north-korea/.
200
See James Vincent, Putin Says the Nation that Leads in AI ‘Will be the Ruler
of the World,’ VERGE (Sept., 2017, 4:52 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world.
201
Peter Holley, Elon Musk calls for Ban on Killer Robots Before ‘Weapons of
Terror’
are
Unleashed,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/08/21/elon-muskcalls-for-ban-on-killer-robots-before-weapons-of-terror-areunleashed/?utm_term=.291b5408d081.
202
See Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence
Could End Mankind, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-30290540.
203
Sam Harris, What Happens When Humans Develop Super Intelligent AI,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 15, 2017, 9:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2017/09/15/547886482/sam-harris-what-happens-when-humans-develop-superintelligent-ai (“The concern is really that we will build machines that are so much
more competent than we are, that the slightest divergence between their goals and
ours, could destroy us.”).
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full artificial intelligence”204 and would prefer analysis less focused
on “sci-fi scenarios or doomsday proclamations” and more driven
by the need to “set up the structures, the understandings, the norms
. . . [and] even the rules and laws, that will help us navigate” the
dawn of AI and devices with high levels of, if not true, autonomy.205
The real crux of the issue is that no one is certain that humans
will be able to program robots to act in the manner at least as good
as a human would, given a complex, dynamic, fast moving situation
such as whether or not to employ perhaps lethal force as a law
enforcement patrol officer in accordance with the existing
constitutional legal standards. However, it is worth noting here that
human-like decision making is a double-edged sword, and some
writers have staked out the position that robot-like decision making
could in fact be superior to human decision making because it would
presumably be free of emotion and bias.206
Scholars, scientists, and ethicists who focus on robotic warfighting have the same concerns with the ability of AI-powered
autonomous weapons applying the International Humanitarian
Law(IHL) or Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) specifically with
regard to the core principles of distinction and proportionality.207
Layered throughout this concern is the idea that once robots figure
out that it is sometimes acceptable to kill humans, there may be no
accounting for how or when a “learning” AI might choose to do so
204

Cellan-Jones, supra note 202; see also Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force,
supra note 4, at 78 (“We are not close to having AI on a human level.”).
205
Illing, supra note 199 (providing Peter Singer’s thoughts on the subject via
interview).
206
See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 29–36
(describing the advantages of machines over humans in lethal decision making in
that the former lacks emotion). But see CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 18, at 13–20
(describing how bias can work its way into computer programs, especially where
programmers are not diverse); Rosenberg, supra note 15.
207
See SOLIS, supra note 144, at 539–41; Anderson & Waxman, supra note 46,
at 1103–07; Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 45, at 251-58; Frank Sauer, Stopping
‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,
ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (Oct. 2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT
/2016_10/Features/Stopping-Killer-Robots-Why-Now-Is-the-Time-to-BanAutonomous-Weapons-Systems.

OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement

45

or whether or when it will choose to stop doing so.208 This is
troubling, given some of the inherent advantages that a robot would
have over a human in that they tend to be both more robust and more
relentless in pursuit of whatever they believe their goal to be.209
As a starting point, Alan Schuller recommends that we focus on
building predictability into artificial intelligence that governs warfighting weapons systems.210 He explains that “AI [can and should]
accoun[t] for uncertainty by weighing the probability of certain
outcomes against the desirability of such outcomes.”211 Further, for
an autonomous weapon to act correctly, it must act rationally, which
“depends on both the relative importance of various goals and the
likelihood that and degree to which they will be achieved.”212
Ultimately, “[a]n AI is considered to make rational decisions if and
only if it chooses the action that yields the highest expected utility,
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.”213 Thus,
“[w]e must [strive to] program the computer to achieve the ‘best
possible outcome under the circumstances’” and that once we’ve
achieved that, predictability of action is the threshold for which we
should assess the legality of autonomous war fighting machines.214
While Schuller focuses on autonomous weapons systems in the
context of warfighting, his focus on eliminating uncertainty of
action directly translates to the application of the AI that would
208

See Ryan Browne, US General Warns of Out-of-Control Killer Robots, CNN
(Jul. 18, 2017, 9:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/18/politics/paul-selvagary-peters-autonomous-weapons-killer-robots/index.html; Rick Noack, Stop the
Rise of the ‘Killer Robots,’ Warn Human Rights Advocates, WASH. POST (Nov.
16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/16/
stop-the-rise-of-the-killer-robots-warn-human-rights-advocates/?utm_term=
.0f4654867210.
209
See supra note 208.
210
See Schuller, supra note 38, at 408–12; Alan L. Schuller, Focusing the
Debate on Autonomous Weapon Systems: A New Approach to Linking Technology
and IHL, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEM 27 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross
2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4283-autonomous-weapons-systems.
211
Schuller, supra note 38, at 409.
212
Id. at 411.
213
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
214
Id.

46

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 1

operate a device in U.S. domestic policing, particularly at the
tactical patrol level. Additionally, I believe that the importance of
checking uncertainty of action applies more directly when
discussing robotic police use of force as compared to law
enforcement surveillance because the consequences are more
significant.
If an AI-driven police robot makes a mistake in data collection
or surveillance no one is likely to die. The same is not true with
police use of force decisions, which can be as challenging as, if not
more so than, LOAC decisions because the rules for domestic law
enforcement use of force, which are based on “reasonableness,” are
very much dependent on context and are made even more
challenging because police-use-of-force-decisions are often
extraordinarily time compressed.215 Furthermore, though the LOAC
allows for the deployment of lethal force based on a status
determination,216 reasonable police use of force is nearly always a
conduct-based decision.217
The intersection of context-driven decision making and the
complexity necessary to account for a highly dynamic law
enforcement operating environment seemingly exacerbates the
issues. “The dark irony is that the more advanced robots get, the
more complex they become, and the more potential they have for
failure . . . [for if there is] even one icon wrong in billions of lines
of code . . . the whole system can either shut down or act
unexpectedly.”218 After all “[w]e’ve all had problems with our PCs
freezing up . . . That’s inconvenient. But it’s much more worrisome
if it’s a laptop computer [with a firearm].”219

215

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
E.g., SOLIS, supra note 144, at 201–02 (describing “combatant status” and
noting that “combatants may be attacked at any time until they surrender or are
otherwise hors de combat, and only when actually threatening the enemy”).
217
See Palmiotto, supra note 81, at 39–40.
218
SINGER, supra note 5, at 195.
219
Id. at 197 (quoting technology journalist Noah Shachtman).
216
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4. Employing robots in law enforcement invariably increases the
trend of the militarization of police.
Public concern over the militarization of police dates as far back
to civilization’s first use of an organized central police force in
ancient Rome.220 In the United States, the 3rd Amendment to the
Constitution represents one of the first efforts by Americans to keep
soldiers from enforcing domestic law.221 After slipping the yoke of
Britain, the young United States stepped away from this idea for a
bit in response to Shays’ Rebellion and passed legislation
authorizing the President to call forth state militias to respond to
insurrections.222 This legislation, which has evolved into today’s
Insurrection Act,223 was rarely used in the first 50 years of the United
States save for a few post-Shays occasions.224
The real tension regarding the U.S government employing
troops to enforce law arose from the ashes of the Civil War, when
Federal troops deployed to the Reconstruction-era South to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, which extended Constitutional
protections to the newly freed, former slaves.225 American
Reconstruction efforts were politically charged for many reasons,
not the least of which were the South’s reluctance to fully
enfranchise African Americans with the same rights of their fellow
citizens.226 In part as a result of this tension, the U.S. Congress
220

See BALKO, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that it was Caesar crossing the
Rubicon and bringing a standing Roman Army into Rome to serve as an internal
security force that directly contributed to Rome’s fall).
221
See U.S. CONST. amend. III; BALKO, supra note 12, at 14 (“It was the
deployment of British soldiers to colonial cities strictly for the purpose of
enforcing law that set long-smoldering hostilities [that started the American
Revolution] aflame.”).
222
BALKO, supra note 12, at 18.
223
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (2017).
224
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 18.
225
See U.S. CONST. amend XIV; BALKO, supra note 12, at 23–25
(“Reconstruction was a necessary policy, and it was probably necessary to use
troops to enforce it. But it was a once-in-American-history sort of crisis . . . . After
federal troops were pulled out of the South, the domestic deployment of US [sic]
troops mostly reverted back to limited situations like large-scale riots and violent
insurrections.”).
226
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 23–25.
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passed the posse comitatus act, which to this day establishes as a
matter of law that the Army (and Air Force) cannot be used to
enforce domestic law without the express authority of the
President.227 The Insurrection Act228 scopes this authority, and the
Department of Defense, as a matter of policy, extends posse
comitatus to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces.229
Yet, it does not take actual soldiers or sailors enforcing law to
cause concerns with trying to maintain the idea that police and not
soldiers should enforce domestic law. “Militarization . . . can be
defined in its broadest terms as the social process in which society
organizes itself for the production of violence or the threat
thereof.”230
In the century and a half following the Civil War, America’s
adherence to the primary policy purpose behind the posse comitatus
act (that is, the distinction between soldiers and police) has largely
diminished as the years have passed.231 The late 1960s brought
significant social unrest as America continued its struggle with race
relations,232 and in the late 1970s and early 1980s the American “war
227

See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2017); Douglas Daniels, How to Allocate
Responsibilities between the Navy and Coast Guard in Maritime
Counterterrorism Operations, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 467, 480–86 (2007)
(describing the posse comitatus statute, how the DoD extended the statute, and
how the Navy works with the Coast Guard to enforce counter-narcotics law at sea
in order to comply the purpose behind posse comitatus).
228
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (2017).
229
See U.S. Dept. of Defense Directive 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian
Law
Enforcement
Officials
(DoD
1989),
https://www.hsdl.org/
?abstract&did=421; The Posse Comitatus Act, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND (May
16,
2013),
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Fact-Sheets/ArticleView/Article/ 563993/the-posse-comitatus-act/ (noting that of all of the armed
forces, only the U.S. Coast Guard is at all times both an armed force and law
enforcement agency). Compare 14 U.S.C. § 1 (2017), with 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89
(2017).
230
Peter B. Kraska, Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters, in
MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (Peter B. Kraska
ed., 2001) (emphasis omitted).
231
See generally Laurence Armand French, Use of Deadly Force, in POLICE
USE OF FORCE 39-40 (Michael Palmiotto ed., 2017).
232
See WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 323.
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on drugs” got underway.233 Both brought a significant militarization
of police, as police departments in general—but specifically the
ones in large metropolitan cities—partnered with the military to
develop tactics, create specialized weapons and tactics (SWAT)
units, and fielded increasingly deadly weapons to counter the
perceived public safety threat posed by the illegal narcotics trade.234
As the 1980s progressed, this effort redoubled in response to the
crack epidemic.235 And after the tragic terror attacks of September
11, 2001, they seemingly redoubled again.236 In 2018, it’s not
uncommon to see American police on patrol in major American
cities armed with assault rifles, Kevlar helmets, and full flak
protection, much like a U.S. soldier on patrol in Afghanistan.237
While these efforts do not run afoul of posse comitatus, they have
marked a fundamental shift in police tactics, procedures, and even
appearance that many argue undermines the legitimacy of the police
as an institution.238
233
234

Id. at 327; BALKO, supra note 12, at 141–45, 147–50, 157–58.
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 132–33; WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 324–

27.

235

See BALKO, supra note 12, at 155–57 (describing the LAPD’s experiments
with an armored battering ram used to breach “crack houses.”). For a
demonstration of the LAPD battering ram in action, see DRAGNET (Universal
Pictures 1987).
236
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 242–43 (“Terrorism would also provide new
excuses for police agencies across the country to build up their arsenals and for
yet smaller towns to start up yet more SWAT teams. The second half of the decade
also saw more mission creep for SWAT teams and more pronounced
militarization even outside of drug policing.”).
237
See Nevitt, supra note 12.
238
See Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 244 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski
eds., 1988) (“While extricating police from the shabby sides of urban politics and
establishing discipline within the ranks were no small achievements in the history
of U.S. police, the military metaphor that made those achievements possible
brought with it some mighty long-term costs. Administratively, it left U.S. police
with a quasi-military administrative structure that is wholly inappropriate as a
device for managing the highly discretionary activity of police work.”); Radley
Balko, Militarized Policing Doesn’t Reduce Crime and Disproportionately Hits
Black
Communities,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/08/22/militarized-
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The so called “1033 program” is a direct contributor to the
symbolic impact of police militarization in the United States:
Faced with a bloated military and what it perceived as a worsening drug
crisis, the 101st Congress in 1990 enacted [a] National Defense
Authorization Act. Section 1208 of the NDAA allowed the Secretary of
Defense to “transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of
the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that
the Secretary determines is— (A) suitable for use by such agencies in
counter-drug activities; and (B) excess to the needs of the Department of
Defense.” It was called the 1208 Program. In 1996, Congress replaced
Section 1208 with Section 1033.239

In the intervening years since the implementation of the 1033
program, police forces of all sizes around the country took huge
advantage of the 1033 program and purchased military assault and
sniper rifles and optics, grenade launchers, mine resistant trucks,
image intensifiers, night vision goggles, and riot gear.240 During the
life of the program, the Department of Defense transferred a
staggering $5.4 billion worth of gear to police departments around
the nation.241
Recognizing that “militarized gear sometimes gives people a
feeling like [police] are an occupying force as opposed to part of the
policing-doesnt-reduce-crime-and-disproportionately-hits-blackcommunities/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3a8a3ed13d14 (citing to a study
published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science that concluded
that “there’s little upside to militarized policing”); Jonathan Mummolo, What I
Learned by Studying Militarized Policing, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/where-is-the-data-onpolice-behavior/568258/ (asserting that “militarized policing does not, on
average, make either the public or police any safer, [and] it may tarnish the
reputation of police). See generally BALKO, supra note 12; WILLIAMS, supra note
118.
239
Taylor Wofford, How America’s Police Became an Army: The 1033
Program, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
how-americas-police-became-army-1033-program-264537.
240
Id.; see also Tom Jackman, Trump to Restore Program Sending Surplus
Military Weapons, Equipment to Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/08/27/trumprestores-program-sending-surplus-military-weapons-equipment-topolice/?utm_term=.004259579ae4.
241
See Jackman, supra note 240.
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community there to protect them,” President Obama placed limits
on the program.242 Shortly after arriving in office, President Trump
repealed those limits.243
The idea that police are not soldiers (and vice versa) is a
fundamental lynchpin to a free and democratic society wellgrounded in the Constitution and Federal law.244 While the recent
trend has strayed away from this idea, the public—and even some
police departments and government officials—once again recognize
the threat to our society that over-militarized police pose, if for no
other reason than the axiomatic dynamic that once government has
a tool, they’re going to want to use it.245 Thus, the same dynamic will
hold true with robotic policing given the far above human
capabilities they bring to law enforcement. The issue is how to best
strike a balance between the increased capacity and enhanced
capabilities robotic policing provides, without crossing the
proverbial Rubicon as Caesar did when he marched his legions into
Rome to “protect” the people.246
5. The accountability gap.
Finally, one of the key concerns with unmanned devices is that
their use may make accountability for their misuse difficult.247 This
242

Id.
Id.
244
See generally BALKO, supra note 12, at xiv, 322–32 (recommending that in
order to stop the trend of police militarization, we should “[h]alt the [m]ission
[c]reep[,]” increase “[t]ransparency[,]” focus on “[c]ommunity [p]olicing[,]”
change “[p]olice [c]ulture[,]” and demand greater “[a]ccountability”).
245
See id. at 133 (quoting philosopher Abraham Kaplan, who describes the
“Law of the Instrument: when you’re carrying a hammer, everything looks like a
nail”).
246
Id. at 3.
247
See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 5, at 200 (“[T]he use of autonomous
drones would not always allow someone to be held accountable for actions.”);
Michael Bourbonniere, Law, Technology and the Conduct of Hostilities in Space,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES
164 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg ed., 2011); Anderson & Waxman, supra note
46, at 1110 (“Therefore, the difficulty is, as many have pointed out, that somehow
human responsibility and accountability for the actions taken by the machine
evaporate and disappear. The soldier in the field cannot be expected to understand
243
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is not so much so where a human being is operating the device or is
responsible for the use of force,248 but it is more applicable the more
autonomous a device tends to be.249 Thus:
[presumably] a computer programmer program[s] these robots so that
they function correctly and supposedly in accordance with the law . . . .
Should one of these fully autonomous robots go “stupid” as sometimes
happens with smart weapons, there has to be a liability regime which
holds the owners of these things responsible . . . . The fundamental issue
is necessarily that of accountability and competing human interests.
Those who decide to use fully autonomous robots . . . should . . . remain
accountable should there be innocent victims from the use of these
machines, irrespective of the quality of the programming . . . . An
effective liability regime will go a long way in assuring the correct use
of these machines and increase the need for their constant human
supervision.250

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.
Given these tensions, I propose the following rules to help
govern what I believe will be the inevitable widespread use of
robotic police. All of these rules are generally premised on the
underlying idea that there should be an inverse relationship between
autonomy and lethality when discussing robotic use of force in the
context of American law enforcement.
Rule 1: Comply with current trends in the state of the law
when conducting surveillance and “search” activities.
I am choosing to start with a brief analysis on robotic police
surveillance because surveillance is inextricably intertwined with
in any serious way the programming of the machine; the designers and
programmers operate on a completely different legal standard; the operational
planners could not know exactly how the machine would perform in the fog of
war[.]”). See generally BONNIE DOCHERTY, MIND THE GAP, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-gap/lackaccountability-killer-robots.
248
See Alison Brown, Understanding the Law of Police Use of Force, in POLICE
USE OF FORCE 113-42 (Michael Palmiotto ed., 2017) (outlining the available State
and Federal criminal and civil liability regimes for illegal police use of force).
249
See, e.g., DOCHERTY, supra note 247 (describing the accountability issues
with autonomous warfighting weapons).
250
See Bourbonniere, supra note 247, at 164.
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the potential for police to use force, in that it provides increased
opportunities for law enforcement to respond to allegations and
reports of crime. In a string of aviation-surveillance cases, The
Supreme Court articulated that “the Fourth Amendment simply does
not require the police traveling in the public airways at [an altitude
of 400-1000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is
visible to the naked eye.”251 Yet, Justice O’Connor considered the
relative infrequency of police helicopter patrols as part of her
concurring opinion in Riley, “suggesting that more frequent lowaltitude flights might impact whether it is reasonable for one to
expect privacy from aerial observations.”252
Thus, one can extrapolate what reasonable, warrantless
autonomous or remotely-piloted police drone surveillance could
look like by layering in the Kyllo holding, which seems to stand for
the idea that police may not use technological means not widely
available to the public to breach the inherent privacy of the home
without first obtaining a warrant,253 and Jones, specifically the
concurrence led by Justice Alito, which represents the idea that
warrantless police surveillance is limited to human standards of
persistence.254
Under the first aspect of this extrapolation, airborne police
surveillance is likely limited to surveillance conducted by the naked
eye, and even if there is room to expand on that standard, such an
expansion would not be so great as to allow a device or sensor that
could breach the sanctity of the home, even one with comparatively
rudimentary capabilities by today’s standards, as was used in
Kyllo.255

251

Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (quoting California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)); see McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial
Surveillance, supra note 7, at 374–76.
252
McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7, at 377;
see Riley, 488 U.S. at 452–56 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
253
See Jenks, supra note 7, at 1422.
254
Id. at 1423; see United States v. Jones, 563 U.S. 400, 419–31 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring).
255
See Kyllo v. Unites States, 533 U.S. 27, 27–28 (2001).
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Next, drone operational altitudes are likely limited to those used
by the public. In Riley it was 400 feet.256 The Ciraolo court set this
mark at 1,000 feet.257 This is consistent with the FAA and DoJ drone
guidelines which currently limits police operations of UAS to 400
feet and below.
Finally, the Jones court indicates that there are likely temporal
limits in play. There, Justice Alito in his concurrence “claimed an
inability to identify with precision the point at which the tracking of
this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before
the 4-week mark.”258 Regardless, for now, “[g]iven that current UAS
are piloted from the ground, such continuous surveillance seems
unlikely for the same reasons that it was unlikely that police officers
would have chosen to physically follow Jones around.”259 However,
this would only remain true if the current FAA/DOJ guidelines
requiring that remotely piloted devices be operated within sight of
their operators remain in place.260
The next step in police use of UAS or robotic technology will
likely be remotely piloted devices operating in a location far
removed from its operator, as a way station on the path to semiautonomous devices, which themselves will be a way-station on the
path to fully autonomous devices. Today, geographically separated,
remotely piloted devices are largely the current state of the art in
military UAS operations with a transition towards types with greater
autonomy.261 As this trend inevitably takes shape in the context of
domestic law enforcement drone use, police departments should
256

See Riley, 488 U.S. at 445, 450.
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
258
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 419–31 (Alito J., concurring); Jenks, supra note 7, at
1421 (citing to Jones’ discussion on technology used by the police that exceeds
human capabilities of persistent surveillance). But see Carpenter v. United States,
585 U.S. ___ (2018) (concluding, seemingly, that GPS tracking in excess of seven
days is likely unreasonable, but narrowly limiting the holding to the facts of that
case).
259
Jenks, supra note 7, at 1422.
260
See Brumfield, supra note 7, at n.69–70.
261
See SINGER, supra note 5, at 34–36. See generally Singer, TED Talk, supra
note 29.
257
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account for the likely temporal limits on how long a domestic law
enforcement drone or unmanned vehicle may surveille a suspect.262
Here, despite all of the discussion of seeing things through the
use of surveillance, it is also worth noting that it is easy to miss the
proverbial forest through the trees, in that the issue may not be so
much unmanned surveillance as it is about just persistent
surveillance and how much easier digital imagery and data storage
technology has made it for police to broadly surveil their
jurisdictions.263 For instance:
[i]n 2014, residents of Compton, California learned that their city had
been the subject of a 2012 experiment in total video monitoring. . . . The
LA County Sheriff’s Department contracted with a private surveillance
company to test an airborne camera that monitored the entire city 24hours a day using high resolution video of everything that happened
inside the 10-square mile municipality. . . . The imagery was archived,
so that if a crime had been reported during that period, the police could
back and retrieve the video and zoom in on the location of the crime.264

By decoupling the on-scene human operator, “operationallevel,” long range/long loiter time, unmanned vehicles with
Predator-like capabilities265 would make it easier for police
262

See McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for
Legislators, supra note 10; McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial
Surveillance, supra note 7.
263
See McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for
Legislators, supra note 10 (arguing that legislators should reject a warrant-based
approach and instead focus on a property rights and duration-based approach to
regulating aerial police surveillance); McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial
Surveillance, supra note 7, at 386.
264
Mark Andrejevic, Theorizing Drones and Droning Theory, in DRONES AND
UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 27 (Ales Zavrsnik ed., 2016); see also Finn, supra
note 61; Reel, supra note 61.
265
See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 4, at 18–19 (noting that it was the
Predator’s “wimpy[,] gas sipping” engine and “long wingspan that allowed it to
stay in the air for potentially up to forty hours . . . gathering intelligence and
relentlessly tracking targets”); PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 18 ([A Predator crew]
“consisted of at least a pilot and sensor operator (sometimes accompanied by a
data analysts) who sat in faux leather chairs and manipulated control sticks, like
those of a conventional aircraft, to fly the plane . . . . [L]ow fuel consumption
helped to keep the cost of operating the machine down . . . . [And] by cycling
crews . . . drone surveillance could be maintained for aircraft’s entire flight time
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departments to engage in this type of persistent, broad range
airborne surveillance.266 In fact, some are already engaging in using
manned aircraft.267 It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Air Force
recently terminated its Predator program in favor of the more
capable (and more expensive) Reaper,268 and, as such, there is or will
be soon a relative stockpile of “pre-owned” DoD Predators looking
for homes, and ripe for 1033 transfer.269
Therefore, I believe it is foreseeable that after another terror
event or mass shooting, a domestic law enforcement agency will
challenge the FAA/DOJ guidelines to push the envelope on drone or
robotic mass surveillance.270 If they do so, before springing for a
Predator system or another likely expensive, operational-level UAS
to conduct surveillance, they may be well served to pay close
attention to the direction the Court is moving before expending
scarce fiscal resources developing and fielding such a program.
Long loiter time, unmanned surveillance with greater-thanhuman sensory detection capabilities would clearly be a very useful
tool in certain high risk/high consequence operations like the
aforementioned Las Vegas shooting or in an ongoing Mumbai-type

of potentially up to forty hours . . . and if another drone was ready to replace the
first, close surveillance could be maintained continuously.”).
266
See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 5, at 23 (describing the drone mounted
“Gorgon Stare” program used by the military in the war on terror, that used 368
cameras that took “video at the rate of twelve frames per second, and the 1.8
billion pixel composite image took up several terabytes of data every minute”).
267
See Andrejevic, supra note 264; Finn, supra note 61; Reel, supra note 61.
268
See Iain Thomson, US Air Force Terminates Predator Drones. Now You will
Fear
the
Reaper,
REGISTER
(Feb.
27,
2017,
9:27
PM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/27/us_air_force_put_predator_drones/
(reporting that the U.S. military is replacing the Predator with the “more powerful
MQ-9 Reaper drone”).
269
See, e.g., Jackman, supra note 240.
270
See generally McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, supra
note 7, at 384–87 (using security of a marathon to describe the challenges of
applying the existing warrant paradigm to legitimate police use of UAS for public
safety and security).
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terror attack.271 Thus, while it may be reasonable to read in a warrant
requirement for day-to-day police drone/UAS surveillance
operations of a persistent nature, especially those with enhanced
sensory capabilities consistent with the Riley, Kyllo, and Jones line
of cases, the law should not be so inflexible as to strictly prohibit
such police drone/UAS operations in true exigency either with or
without a post-hoc warrant.272
Rule 2: Prohibit independent “tactical” patrol operations of
robotic police. Police departments may, however, deploy robotic
units independently for discrete purposes, such as crime scene
analysis, under the on-scene supervision by a human.
Otherwise, robotic police should only deploy with human
“partners” on tactical patrol.
This proposed rule maintains the momentum towards
community policing, which relies heavily on human-to-human
interaction, establishing and leveraging relationships, and building
trust between police officers and the communities they serve.273 As
I discussed above, robots, remotely-operated or otherwise, are not
human, and it thus stands to reason that community members may
have difficulty establishing the trust and relationships with them

271

See id.; Somini Sengupta & Keith Bradsher, Mumbai Terrorist Siege Over,
India Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/11/29/world/asia/29mumbai.html.
272
See supra notes 72–74. See generally George L. Blum, Romualdo P.
Eclavea, Alan J. Jacobs & Eric C. Surette, Exigent Circumstances as Justifying
Warrantless Search, 68 AM. JUR. 2D, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 133 (Nov. 2017)
(“Exigent circumstances, justifying a warrantless search [into an area where there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy], exist where there is a compelling need for
official action and no time to secure a warrant. Exigent circumstances are deemed
to exist if a reasonable law enforcement officer can believe that a person is in need
of immediate aid, and there is a situation demanding immediate action, or there is
no time to get a warrant; such circumstances arise when law enforcement officers
confront a compelling necessity for immediate action that would brook the delay
of obtaining a warrant.”).
273
See Mary Ann Wycoff, The Benefits of Community Policing: Evidence and
Conjecture, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 103–16 (Jack R.
Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988).
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necessary for successful community policing.274 This is important
because community policing may in fact be more effective than
traditional police tactics and serves as a kind of check against the
trend of police militarization.275
Further, teaming humans with robots aligns with what many
believe is the next step in the military’s use of more autonomous
systems.276 This strategy results in a kind of synergy of operation in
that it allows “[t]he robot . . . [to] do what robots do best . . . [and]
[p]eople [to] do what people do best.”277 Of course, effective
deployment of human/robot teams presumes further development in
two critical areas—communication between the human and its robot
partner and trust,278 which Schuller argues is grounded in
predictability of action.279

274

See Timothy N. Oettmeier & Lee P. Brown, supra note 174, at 121–34. But
see SINGER, supra note 5, at 337–42 (describing the human tendency to
anthropomorphize or “give human characteristic to something not human”
thereby perhaps making it easier to develop the community policing fostering
relationships with a police robot).
275
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 325; Carl B. Klockars, supra note 238, at 239–
58; WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 330–32.
276
See SINGER, supra note 5, at 132–34; Spencer Ackerman, The Pentagon
Doesn’t Trust Its Own Robots, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2012, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2012/09/robot-autonomy/; Kelsey D. Atherton, Robots
May Replace One-Fourth of U.S. Combat Soldiers By 2030, Says General,
POPULAR SCIENCE (Jan 22, 2014), https://www.popsci.com/article/
technology/robots-may-replace-one-fourth-us-combat-soldiers-2030-saysgeneral; Denise Chow, Gun-Toting Robots May Fight Alongside Soldiers in
Future
Battles,
LIVE SCIENCE (Oct.
21,
2013,
4:08
PM),
https://www.livescience.com/40582-military-machine-gun-robots.html; FranzStefan Gady, Super Humans and Killer Robots: How the US Army Envisions
Warfare in 2050, DIPLOMAT (July 24, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/
2015/07/super-humans-and-killer-robots-how-the-us-army-envisions-warfare-in2050/; Tobin Harshaw, Uncle Sam Wants You . . . to Fight Alongside a Killer
Robot, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2017, 9:32 AM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/view/articles/2017-09-09/uncle-sam-wants-you-to-fight-alongside-a-killerrobot.
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SINGER, supra note 5, at 133.
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See id. at 133–34.
279
See generally Schuller, supra note 38.
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Finally, with specific regard to law enforcement’s use of robotic
unmanned aircraft, this rule also has the benefit of remaining
consistent with the current DOJ/FAA MOU which requires UAS be
operated within sight of their operator.280 Granted, I do not believe
that this guidance will continue in force as drone, robotic, and AI
technology continues to develop and proliferate, specifically from
the military to the police281 and perhaps even ultimately to the
public.282 The advantages provided by robotic policing are just too
great to be limited to remotely-operated, line-of-sight operations.
But, for now, compliance with the DOJ/FAA MOU cuts towards
establishing this rule as a sort of check against the current state of
technology which has yet to reach the level of maturity and
predictability that Schuller argues is necessary to assuage concerns
of misuse.
Rule 3: Prohibit the use of force from operational devices
because doing so helps prevent the further militarization of
police.
This rule is intended to prevent police departments from
launching a war-on-terror-type drone strike using a high-flying,
“operational-type” device like a Predator or Reaper283 that would
orbit the police jurisdiction ready to employ lethal force on someone
targeted by law enforcement.
The scholar Peter Kraska, who has written extensively on the
militarization of American police,284 has generated a list of tangible
indices of police militarization.285 They include:
280

Brumfield, supra note 7, at n.69–70.
See Sandvik, supra note 34, at 48-50, 53–58.
282
C.f. Tim Dickinson, How the AR-15 Became Mass Shooters’ Weapon of
Choice,
ROLLING
STONE
(Feb.
22,
2018,
4:20PM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/how-the-ar-15-became-massshooters-weapon-of-choice-w451452; James Fallows, More on the Military and
Civilian History of the AR-15, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2017, 5:41 PM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2017/11/on-the-military-and-civilian-historyof-the-ar-15/545660/ (tracing the history of the AR-15).
283
See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 20–25 (describing the developmental
history of both).
284
See BALKO, supra note 12, at 206–10.
285
See WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 322.
281
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(1) A blurring of external and internal security functions leading to a
targeting of civilian populations, internal “security” threats, and a focus
on aggregate populations as potential internal insurgents[;]
(2) An avoidance of overt or lethal violence, with a greater emphasis
placed on information gathering and processing, surveillance work, and
less-than-lethal technologies[;]
(3) An ideology and theoretical framework of militarism that stresses
that effective problem solving requires state force, technology
armament, intelligence gathering, aggressive suppression efforts, and
other assorted activities commensurate with modern military thinking
and operations[;]
(4) Criminal justice practices guided by the ideological framework of
militarism, such as the use of special operations paramilitary teams in
policing and corrections, policing activities that emphasize military
tactics such as drug, gun, and gang suppression, and punishment models
based on military boot camp[;]
(5) The purchasing, loaning, donation, and use of actual material
products that can be characterized as militaristic, including a range of
military armaments, transportation devices, surveillance equipment, and
military style garb[;]
(6) A rapidly developing collaboration, at the highest level of the
government and corporate worlds, between the defense and industry and
the crime control industry[;]
(7) The use of military language within political and popular culture, to
characterize the social problems of drugs, crime, and social disorder.286

Police use of drones and unmanned devices in general, and at
the operational level specifically, implicates Kraska’s indicia
numbers (1)-(3), (5), and (6).287 There are clear public safety and
security benefits to using robotic police devices and there may come
a day when operational-level drones or robots, remotely piloted or
otherwise, orbit American cities. Yet in order to balance the benefits
of robotic policing against the ills that robotic policing represents in
terms of what would clearly be the further militarization of the
American police, I propose a strict ban on any use of force from
“operational”-level UAS, as per se unreasonable.288 Drones working
286
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in coordination with police on patrol, optimally in teams, to improve
the capabilities of human police so that they can better do their job
is one thing.289 High-flying, “Big-Brother-like” persistent
surveillance devices coupled to the capability to engage suspects
with force, either autonomously or without even really having a
human present on scene, is quite another.290
This is not to say though, that tactical-level police employments
of remotely-operated or autonomous use of force do not come with
similar risks. For example, “Switchblade [is] a microdrone with a
lethal payload that has been used in Afghanistan since 2012.”291
At about 24 in. in length, and weighing between 5 and 6 lbs., and with a
price tag between $40,000 and $150,000, the Switchblade—variously
referred to by its admirers as the kamikaze drone and the ultimate
assassin bug—can be transported in the trunk of a car and assembled and
deployed in a matter of minutes by a . . . police officer chasing a
suspect—whom it can not only find but kill [with an explosive
charge].292

Switchblade can either be piloted or can fly autonomously.293
Again, there are great benefits to fielding tactical drones in U.S.
domestic law enforcement, including capability benefits that
departments and agencies all around the nation are currently reaping
and capacity benefits that with increased levels of autonomy they
may soon also do so. But there are individual and societal risks to
their use, especially if domestic law enforcement agencies follow
the drone use evolutionary progression of the military and begin
arming their drones.294 Thus, I also propose the below rules on
tactical police use of force to help address clear civil rights and
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Constitutional concerns with the potential of police officers using
“kamikaze drones.”295
Rule 4: Checks on lethality and autonomy by mitigating
against uncertainty of action.296
This rule is broken into three parts and is intended to establish
an inverse relationship between autonomy and lethality as a means
of mitigating the risks inherent in equipping increasingly capable
autonomous devices with the ability to employ deadly force.
A. Remotely-piloted and semi-autonomous devices on tacticallevel patrol with a human partner may reasonably apply force,
up to and including deadly force.
Again, the legality of U.S. police use of force is based on an
objective reasonableness standard.297 Thus, it may be reasonable for
a remotely-operated or semi-autonomous device operating on patrol,
in conjunction with a human, to employ force, including deadly
force, in which the human operator makes the decision on the
employment of force, but we likely will not know for sure until it
happens. However, as a general proposition, we know that U.S.
police may use up to and including deadly force when they have
“probable cause to believe the suspect poses a risk to the safety of
policy officers or the community.”298 This includes the application
of force to apprehend a fleeing felon where the officer can articulate
that the felon posed a serious threat to the public.299
Michael Palmiotto writes that Graham v. Connor, the last case
the Supreme Court took up on police use of force, established a loose
framework in analyzing the reasonableness of that force by seeking
answers to the following three questions: “1. What is the nature or
severity of the offense? 2. Did the suspect pose an immediate threat
to the officer or others? 3. Is the suspect actively resisting or
295
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attempting to escape?”300 In analyzing this, courts review the totality
of the circumstances at the time the officer decided to use force301
while also accounting for the inherent stress and pressure a human
officer would encounter in having to make a use-of-force decision.302
Applying Palmiotto’s Graham factors and assuming sufficient
sensor and data link technology that optimizes quality of sensory
data yet minimizes latency303 along with the ability to effectively
communicate both with the subject and the operator’s partner, then
it is reasonable to conclude that the police operator of a remotelypiloted or semi-autonomous device in the near future will likely be
able to obtain or develop enough information on scene to address all
of these factors.
Depending on the circumstances, it may also be necessary for
the operator to be able to first positively identify the subject to
satisfy the first or second factors.304 Otherwise, the operator would
need only to directly observe the subject and, where relevant, use
the device’s sensors to observe the offense and the environment in
which the subject and the device are located. Alternatively, it may
also be sufficient if the operator were able to obtain some of this
information on scene by communicating with their human partner,
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dispatch the subject, or other members of the public, as
appropriate.305
Courts have granted great deference to police whom are forced
to “make split second [use of force] judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” and police make
those judgments by using their senses to assess their environment.306
The ability to rely on senses will, however, differ greatly between a
device operator and a human on scene.307 For example, the human
on scene would have access to all five of their senses308 whereas the
robot operator would likely be limited to sight and hearing.
Developments in immersive virtual reality may soon change this.309
Notwithstanding these developments, the robot operator’s ability to
see and hear will likely be well beyond what their human
counterparts see and hear, which courts may find as providing a
sufficient offset for the lack of ability to touch, taste, and feel, when
trying to assess the reasonableness of a decision to employ force.

305

See generally United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“[P]olice observation of an individual, fitting a police dispatch description of a
person involved in a disturbance, near in time and geographic location to the
disturbance establishes a reasonable suspicion that the individual is the subject of
the dispatch.”).
306
See Joh, supra note 7, at 536 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97).
307
See Breshears, supra note 7, at 204–08.
308
Id.; see generally Nicholas St. Fleur, This Exhibition Will Help You Make
Sense
of
Your
Senses,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/arts/design/our-senses-exhibitionamerican-museum-of-natural-history.html (reporting on an exhibition in New
York City intended to highlight human senses).
309
See Noor Farhan, A Glimpse of the Future? South Korea to Pilot Next-gen
ICT Technology at 2018 Winter Olympics, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Nov. 4, 2017,
10:20 AM), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/technology/south-korea2018-winter-olympics-pyeongchang-ict-technology-9375108 (reporting that
South Korea is developing “ultra-high speed 5G wireless data transmission
system – up to 10 times faster than current 4G networks found in everyday
smartphones” to facilitate “remote piloting of drones and driverless vehicles of
the future”); Ben Popper, Drones and Virtual Reality Headsets are a Delicious
Combination, VERGE (Nov. 24, 2014, 10:28 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2014/11/24/7274997/parrot-bebop-drone-virtual-reality.

OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement

65

Furthermore, physically removing the robot operator from the
situation may drive more deliberative, less time compressed
decision making because the robot operator would not be in
individual peril.310 This results in a dynamic, though, in which the
more immersed the operator is in her access to more human-like
sensory input when controlling the device, the less valuable this
potential advantage may become. 311 Being physically removed from
the scene also eliminates individual self-defense as a justification
for the robot to employ force, but would not impact use of force
grounded in defense of others against an imminent threat or
dangerous fleeing felon.312
In ascertaining reasonableness, a “notoriously opaque and factdependent” assessment, courts could also consider the sufficiency
of the available sensors and processing latency as compared to the
state of the art, the quantity and quality of information that the
device operator relied on at the time she made her decision to
employ force, the amount of coordination between her and her
human partner, and to what extent the operator communicated with
the subject.313
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B. It will also likely be reasonable to employ tools designed and
intended to apply less than lethal force, even from autonomous
tactical device, when operating in conjunction with a human.
This analysis focuses on the deployment of non-lethal or less
than lethal tools from a fully autonomous, unmanned device or
robot.314 For example, “[i]n 2007, iRobot announced a “strategic
alliance” with Taser International, to develop a Taser-equipped
version of its popular Packbot[:]” a land-based device used by the
U.S. military that could be easily converted for domestic law
enforcement purposes.315 Police departments deploying such tools
from a remotely-operated device is covered by the analysis
immediately above.
Further, this analysis assumes several things. First, it assumes
the removal of the current FAA/DOJ guidance that essentially
prohibits the operation of fully autonomous or remotely-piloted
unmanned devices from being operated outside of the line of sight
of their operator.316 Again though, this FAA guidance would
presumably only apply to flying devices and would not reach land
based robots.317 Second, it assume the development of sufficient
sensor and artificial intelligence which would allow for on-scene
decision making capabilities at least equal to that of a human patrol
officer.
Scholar Alan Schuller proposed five principles to avoid illegal
autonomy, in the context of autonomous weapons systems in armed
conflict. Four of the five translate relatively easily to some extent or
314
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another to U.S. domestic law enforcement’s possible future use of
more autonomous devices.318
First, Schuller states that “[t]he decision to kill may never be
functionally delegated to a computer.”319 Here, I propose that more
autonomous police robots be limited in the tools they are equipped
with to those that are non-lethal or at least, certainly less than lethal
than a firearm.320 Courts currently disfavor this tactic as they tend to
believe that “defining police use of force as lethal or not should not
be an orienting focus” because “there is no obvious way to quantify
the risks created by a [police] officer’s specific action.”321 While
non-lethal weapons can be used to lethal effect,322 distinguishing
between weapons like firearms that are designed and intended to be
lethal and those that are not such as Electronic Control Devices (i.e.,
a Taser) and pepper spray should satisfy Schuller’s first principle
given the discussion of his additional applicable principles below
and “the fact that the use of a dangerous law enforcement tool is not,
per se, a use of deadly force.”323
Second, Schuller notes that “[armed robots] may be lawfully
controlled through programming alone . . . [despite not being] able
to perceive, process, and act upon all the factors humans consider
before employing lethal force.”324 Schuller continues by articulating
that, through cataloging expected variables, establishing which
variables we can expect the robot to observe, defining which
variables are important to a use of force decision, and then finally
determining how a learning robot may attempt to address those
variables, it becomes relatively manageable to program the robot’s
computer processor “to evaluate the probability of certain outcomes
318
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as compared to the expected utility of particular actions.”325 In the
case of a fully autonomous law enforcement device, its operating
system could relatively easily be programmed with force
employment parameters that would be driven from its sensor feed
and could account for the current legal standards326 and factors
within the operating environment such as whether and to what extent
the subject is armed, his compliance with orders, the presence of
third parties, the location of the nearest police or medical support
unit, and potential risks of further harm to an incapacitated
subject.327
Schuller’s third principle is linked to the second, and it is that
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) “does not require temporally proximate human
interaction with [a robot] prior to lethal kinetic action.”328 Again,
because this paper addresses strictly non-lethal tools in the context
of autonomous devices engaged in U.S. domestic police work,
Schuller’s third principle is not directly applicable, and as such,
bears no further analysis here.
Schuller’s fourth principle is perhaps the most important one for
these purposes because it seemingly stands for the expectation that
an autonomous armed UAS’ predictability of action will be
governed by the familiar reasonableness standard. This principle
“means that the [learning artificial intelligence] system [of an armed
UAS or robot] may in fact be lawfully unpredictable in certain ways.
So long as the ways in which the system is unpredictable are
reasonably unlikely [so as] to render an AWS action unlawful, the
system [itself] may [still] be lawful.”329 Thus, the existing
reasonableness standard already employed by courts to determine
the lawfulness of the use of force should here be flexible enough to
not require an AI be perfect, provided, that an unpredictable
325
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response is reasonably unlikely to result in an unlawful action.330 If
we apply that standard to the idea of autonomous law enforcement
devices wielding weapons designed to be less than lethal, then we
can establish a rule which stands for the idea that it would be
reasonable, and thus lawful for an autonomous police device to
employ non-lethal tools as they are intended to be employed,
provided it does so in a predictable manner.
Finally, Schuller argues “[l]imitations imposed on an
[autonomous robot] may compensate for performance shortfalls” as
his fifth principle.331 This principle is linked to his second and fourth
principles and it represents the concept that restricting actions that
an autonomous armed robot otherwise may be capable of can tilt the
proverbial scale towards reasonableness. For example,
programming a bias that favors inaction over action unless all use of
force criteria are strictly met (which is an analysis that humans
struggle with in the heat of the moment), allowing a robot’s human
partner to interrupt the robot’s use of force, or limiting the types of
weapons it carries332 can help account for the potential of
unpredictable responses and may help drive potentially
unreasonable uses of force towards objective reasonableness.
C. Autonomous police robots should not be armed with weapons
that are designed and intended exclusively for the application
of deadly force.
Autonomous police robots should not be armed with firearms,
and they should not be programmed to use deadly force. From a pure
risk management standpoint, remotely-operated devices where a
human makes the use of force decision and autonomous devices
equipped only with weapons intended to be non- or less-than-lethal
simply do not pose the same societal or individual risk as
autonomous law enforcement devices fielding per se lethal
weapons. Yet this rule may end up as more of a policy determination
than a legal one because the courts loathe categorizing the means in
330
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which police use force as “deadly” or “non-deadly”333 despite
significant litigation regarding “specific forms of force, such as the
use of batons, handcuffs, hogties, or pepper spray” and still others
that address “police dogs, tasers, beanbag projectiles, or carotid
chokeholds.”334
Breaking down the factual circumstances in which police may
employ deadly force and overlaying the Court’s reasonableness
standard helps this analysis. As I have discussed above, police may
use force, including deadly force in self-defense and in the defense
of others, to counter an imminent threat and/or to apprehend a
dangerous fleeing felon.
First, much like where we have a remotely-operated device
where the officer operating the device is far removed from the
location of the device, there is no individual “self-defense”
justification when discussing autonomous police robot use of
force.335 That is the easy part of the analysis.
The defense of others aspect, however, is more challenging to
analyze. To start, I also categorize and analyze the “fleeing felon”
justification in the same manner as the defense of others. I am
lumping these two justifications together because I believe the
fleeing felon rule is a form of the “defense of others” justification,
in that it modifies the imminence requirement to account for the
“status” of the subject as an actor who has established themselves as
capable of posing serious danger to society at any time, establishing
a sort of per se imminence, and has refused to heed a police order to
stop, thereby justifying the use of force for their apprehension.336
The real question for these two justifications of police deadly
force vis-a-vis their application from an autonomous police device
is whether the societal benefit of allowing autonomous devices to
333
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employ deadly force outweighs the risk. 337 This self-styled
“autonomous police device deadly force deployment test” differs a
bit from the Tennessee v. Garner balancing test courts have used to
gauge reasonableness.338 The Garner test purports to weigh “the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests [in not being subject to an unreasonable
seizure] against the importance of the governmental interests alleged
to justify the intrusion.”339 The Supreme Court later modified the
Garner test in Scott, by looking specifically to “the use of a
particular type of force in a particular situation.”340
My test differs from the Garner/Scott test because the latter may
end up as too permissive in this context. If we were to apply the
Garner/Scott test, and assume a level of technological sophistication
that would allow for sensor and information fusing that drives
independent, context-based computer decision making not yet here,
on the horizon,341 we could theoretically arrive at a place where a
court could find it reasonable that an autonomous device used
deadly force in response to an immediate threat to others or in the
apprehension of a fleeing felon, where the device could positively
identify the subject, the crime was sufficiently serious, and the
subject did not comply with an order to stop and be arrested.
Hence, the “autonomous police device deadly force deployment
test,” which should drive the analysis towards non-deployment until
the point where A.I. reaches a level of technical maturity and
societal acceptance342 that would justify its use. To do otherwise,
even though the law may currently allow for it, results in too much
individual and societal risk, well beyond that posed by remotelyoperated law enforcement devices or those equipped only with non-
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or less-than lethal tools.343 The issue of course, is persuading law
enforcement agencies and their political leadership to acknowledge
and understand this, which is in part why I recommend relatively
permissive rules on the use of remotely-operated and non-/less-thanlethal equipped devices. By establishing these guidelines that
facilitates some use, we can allow the relevant technology to
continue to develop in a deliberative, orderly way or make a
collective societal decision that we are simply not interested in
walking down the path of “killer” police robots.344
Rule 5: Strict liability for death or serious bodily injury
where fully autonomous devices employ force inappropriately.
Finally, one of the most pressing concerns with robotic and
autonomous devices is the perception of an accountability vacuum,
which is brought into keen focus when discussing police use of these
devices as equipped to employ force. This concern is lessened where
a human operator makes the use-of-force decision because the
existing accountability structure would remain in play.345 Things
become a bit murkier though, if the robot makes the use of force
decision, even where, as I recommend, we are consciously deciding
to prohibit autonomous devices wielding weapons designed to apply
deadly force.
Again, “[d]eadly force is that force, based on the
circumstances,” which creates a “substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury.”346 Even non-lethal weapons can result in the
application of deadly force.347 Thus, “[d]epending on the evolution
of the technology involved . . . [progressing] towards an absolute
responsibility regime for those who own and operate fully
autonomous robots” may be the best way to address perceived
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accountability gaps with U.S. law enforcement agency deployment
of autonomous devices equipped to use force.348
I recommend a strict civil liability regime as applied to
autonomous police use of force.349 This recommendation does not
address criminal liability, which, even in the case of human officers,
seldom provides victims relief,350 but instead focuses on the potential
for near automatic civil remedies where an autonomous law
enforcement device inappropriately employs force that results in
death or serious bodily injury. All normal civil procedure rules
would apply under this proposal so the law enforcement agency
could theoretically attempt to implead the device’s manufacturer in
any lawsuit,351 but the immediate onus of responsibility would start
with the agency fielding the device. This would incentivize police
departments to take measures to ensure adequate programming of
these tools and to develop appropriate standard operating
procedures, tactics, and deployment guidelines while at the same
time disincentivizing smaller departments from pursing the
capability, which could, in turn, provide a valuable check against
further police militarization nationwide.
VII. CONCLUSION.
The ongoing trend of the militarization of America’s police
forces and the history and existing practice of U.S. domestic law
enforcement agencies rapidly and quietly fielding technological
advances in general, and semi-autonomous and remotely piloted
devices, specifically to execute their mission,352 leads one to draw
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the conclusion that there will be a “push” for American domestic
law enforcement agencies to field fully lethal, fully autonomous
tools sooner rather than later. There are advantages to U.S.-lawenforcement’s use of semi-autonomous and fully autonomous tools,
but it is still critically important to establish some minimum baseline
which adequately accounts for the protection of individual rights
before this occurs. The rules that I proposed will hopefully help do
that. The key, however, will be consistent and early adoption. Doing
so will help us avoid the inevitable problems which will come with
where we are today and our patchwork of U.S. law enforcement
“drone” use without seemingly much thought or public discussion
of how this advanced technology fits within the existing relevant
applicable legal frameworks.

